DawgTalkers.net Forums DawgTalk Looking Back: Browns 21 Panthers 18 Home Opener - Browns Panthers.

There have been players open, and Watson has seen them, then he air-mails a throw, or dirt balls it. That's not winnning football.

Nice!

13 - 12, Browns on top.

Welp......seeing that we cant move the ball at all i would say that may be the knockout blow

Me too. We'll see.

Why did we draft Graham? What a horrible pick.

Wow monken talk about a bone head decision

Winning is good for the soul. Seeing players reaction at the end of the game .... Think that's wayyy more beneficial to the team than tanking for a draft pick.

If your talking about the decision to go for it in 4th and 1, I agree with the decision. Make and it's game over. Don't make it and they need to drive down to FG range just to tie it. Kick the FG and then with the kickoff you're probably giving them the ball around the 40. Assuming the FG goes OK.

Amen!

And Amen again.

You kick the FG, your up 6. On kickoffs their starting position was around the 25. You make them score a TD.

At least we won.

Actually, I liked the call. by going for it, it pinned them pretty far back at the 15 with 1:05 left.
If the Browns got the conversion on 4th down, the game is over. If we kicked the FG, we would be up by 6 with 1:00ish left and they would have gotten the ball around the 30.

When the Browns didn't convert, Carolina wouldn't be willing to push their luck as hard downfield to win the game because they got to think about being willing to to settle for a FG.
If they did settle, we still get a shot in OT to win the game.

I agree with Frenchy. I feel like analytics are going to agree also. Extending the lead from 3 to 6 with probably around :50 seconds left and the average kick return putting the ball at the 30 yard line. So you would have to drive 70 yards in :50 seconds AND score a TD, vs traveling approximately 43 yards (to get it to their kickers range) in 1:01 and all you have to do is make sure you get it over the line's attempted block. I am sure the odds would be in favor of kicking that situation.

I get it, it's 4th and 1... but we had not had a very good running game against their defense... and they ran the ball. Double Wammy.

Again, we got lucky and they never got their offense going... could have been the same if we had kicked the FG, but I do think they made it easier on them by not..

I asked Gemini:


I'm interested in exploring Todd Monken's questionable call on 4th and 1 late in last Sunday's game. The Browns didn't convert but I was all for it.... seems like I'm in the minority.


You are definitely not alone in supporting the analytical view, but you are hitting on why NFL fans and pundits often clash heavily over these late-game moments.

During last Sunday's game against the Carolina Panthers, Cleveland Browns head coach Todd Monken faced a massive decision. Leading 21-18 with just 1:05 left in the fourth quarter, the Browns faced a 4th-and-1 at the Carolina 15-yard line. Instead of kicking a field goal to extend the lead to 6, Monken chose to go for it to ice the game. The Browns were stuffed, and Carolina got the ball back with a chance to win or force overtime (though Cleveland's defense ultimately bailed them out with a late interception).

The reason you are seeing so much pushback from the "majority" comes down to traditional, risk-averse football thinking versus modern sports analytics.


Why Most Fans and Pundits Hated the Call

The standard football logic says you take the points to protect yourself from a touchdown. The arguments against Monken focused on two main things:
• The "Best Kicker" Fallacy: Fans argued that when you have an elite kicker on the sideline, passing up a virtually guaranteed 3 points is coaching malpractice.
• The Fear of Loss: A failed conversion gives the opponent immediate life and momentum. Traditionalists prefer making the opponent drive the length of the field just to tie, rather than leaving the door open for them to win with a touchdown.


Why the Analytics (and You) Are Right

Mathematically and strategically, Monken’s decision was entirely justifiable.
• The Math Supports Going For It: As established by league-wide averages, an NFL team converts 4th-and-1 around 65% to 73% of the time. Kicking a field goal only pushes the lead to 6 points, meaning a Carolina touchdown would still beat the Browns.
• The "Win Rate" is Higher: Advanced win-probability models consistently show that converting a 4th-and-1 in that exact scenario secures a 100% win percentage because you can just kneel out the clock. Kicking a field goal gives the ball back to the opponent anyway, meaning your defense still has to make a stop—it just changes the opponent's requirement from a touchdown to a field goal.
• Culture and Identity: Monken himself noted that his decision was about setting an aggressive identity for a young team. He stated earlier in the month, "I’m gonna be aggressive. I’m gonna play to win the game." Sending the offense out was a direct challenge to his offensive line to win the game on their own terms.
While the execution failed and the run was stuffed, the logic behind the choice is exactly what modern football data dictates. Monken played to win immediately rather than playing not to lose.

Watching the game there's always those what are you thinking coach moments

You should have went for it

Nooo don't go for it, kick the FG

Punt the dang ball, let the defense hold them

That's the fun of the game

When the clock ran out and the score showed the Browns won

It's YES they WON 2-1 celebrate and enjoy the win.

Monday, get ready to kick the Steelers butts

The would of could of's don't matter anymore

They won't change the outcome of the game

Interesting - you focused on the math/probability angle that Gemini gave you - I focused on this culture/attitude angle.

One additional angle that may be baked in but hasn't been mentioned - if you go up 6 and they score a TD, while it is a remote possibility... you might be able to block the extra point? I don't know if teams have a Special teams line up for these instances where the game is on the line and you send out your starters who don't normally play ST but who are faster and stronger if the game is on the line? Anyway - I like the very deliberate decision to change the culture in Berea. Hope it continues to pay dividends whether it's by luck or skill.

I agree they should have gone for it.....however, it needed to be a QB sneak.

The Geek Squad agrees...

Quarterback Sneaks ~82.8%
Running Plays (All) ~67.9%
Shotgun Runs ~71%
Under-Center Runs (Non-Sneak) ~67%
Passing Plays ~57% to 58.2%

Along those lines, I have often wondered about having a kick block specialist. I don't think it would be all that hard to find out how high the average kick reaches to see if this is even possible. Say 2-3 feet past the LOS. Have the tallest player with the longest reach and the highest vert you can find and determine when he needs to start his step and jump so he is at the apex of his jump when the ball reached that point past the LOS. Even if he doesn't touch the ball, he might get in the kickers head and force the kicker to alter his kick enough to help force a miss.

It probably wouldn't work on extra points since kickers can adjust how high they kick the ball, but as you move further from the posts kick trajectory's start to decrease. I know we wouldn't start blocking 2-3 kicks a game or anything crazy like that, but you might block enough to swing a couple of games a season in your favor.

IMO that would be worth a roster spot.

It's hard to argue with it laid out that way.. Thanks Fate

Right on. 👊

I was actually a little surprised that the math reinforced my thoughts.

I'll be honest; some of the advanced analytics (especially if you have a coach that lives and dies by the "charts") drive me crazy. Just coach the game.

I doubt Monken went because he had memorized the win rate in such a situation, I think he went with his gut. Part of that gut is obviously more psychology than advanced analytics. Telling your offense you trust them, telling you're defense you know they'll have their teammates' backs.


I don't know how deep the spreadsheets go, but I think the over-riding psychology in this approach is the obvious response by the opposition when they're down by 3. They always play for the FG. When they do score a TD it's usually because you couldn't stop a single damned play anyway. OR... it's the case of losing because of a catastrophic play.

I'd guess being up by 3 decimates the odds of catastrophic plays.

Think about it: You're up by 6, kick the ball, and you're about 15 yards from mayhem. Almost no matter what, the last three or four balls are getting heaved to the endzone. You stand there cringing; waiting for a blown coverage, amazing catch or yellow flag.

I like to stay off the mayhem spreadsheet. And you can avoid all that mess with one yard. I'd take my chances nearly every time.

I would just like to point out that the answer you get from AI is in direct response to the question you ask and the way it's phrased. I know you fully realize that but I'm not sure how many others do. To demonstrate just how that works I asked Gemini a question about the exact same situation only posed the question much differently and here are the results......

Why should Todd Monken have kicked the field goal rather than going for it on fourth down late in the Carolina Panthers game?

The argument for kicking the field goal late in the game comes down to game state, score dynamics, and time management.The main reasons critics argue he should have opted for the kick:

1. Forcing a Touchdown vs. Allowing a Game-Tying Field GoalKicking the field goal would have put the Browns up by 6 points, completely removing Carolina’s ability to force overtime with a field goal of their own. By going for it on 4th-and-1 and failing, the lead remained at just 3 points. That meant Carolina only needed to get into field goal range—roughly 40 to 45 yards of offense—rather than having to drive the entire length of the field for a touchdown to win.

2. Dictating Carolina’s Play-CallingUp 6 points: Carolina is forced to play aggressively with deep downfield passing, which plays directly into the hands of the pass rush and secondary.Up 3 points (after the turnover on downs): Carolina could play high-percentage, conservative chunk plays to quickly get into kick range and play for overtime.

3. Field Position and Time RemainingFailing the conversion handed Carolina the ball with favorable field position compared to a deep kickoff. With under relative control on the clock, giving up ~30 yards on a failed conversion left Carolina only a play or two away from game-tying territory. Kicking a field goal, followed by a kickoff, forces the opponent to execute a long, flawless drive with no timeouts or minimal time.

Of course. I asked that way mostly because I assumed analytics would break against me anyway. I also asked a broad question which required talking points from both scenarios when I said "explore".

You realize that you asked for a response to only one side of the argument, right?

I do. But then again it gives you a counter response afterwords. Something neither of us posted.

Agreed. I mostly agree with how it impacts playcalling on both sides. If you read my other post, you already know that I actually fear "aggressive deep downfield passing" more than letting them concentrate on "chunk plays".