DawgTalkers.net Forums DawgTalk Pure Football Forum NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Part Deux

Yeah, but if it's 25 hours over 4 days getting something substantive done, then I'm all for it. I have no idea if that's the case, though.

NFL Players Association intends to 'decertify' before collective bargaining agreement expires
BY Ralph Vacchiano
DAILY NEWS SPORTS WRITER

Saturday, February 26th 2011, 10:00 PM


INDIANAPOLIS - The NFL Players Association is preparing to take its battle with the NFL to court.

The union plans to "decertify" before the current collective bargaining agreement expires on Thursday night, according to several reports. That legal maneuver would theoretically dissolve the union and allow players to file for an injunction that would block owners from locking them out.

The owners would undoubtedly attempt to block the union from decertifying, since it would open the league up to antitrust suits from individual players. The league laid the groundwork for that challenge in an unfair labor practice charge it filed against the NFLPA with the National Labor Relations Board on Valentine's Day when it called the union's plans to decertify a "sham" and a "ploy."

What all this means is that the two sides are getting ready for an extended battle that will likely last through the 11:59 p.m. Thursday deadline when the current CBA expires - unless the two sides are able to agree on an extension of the deadline that would delay any lockout or court fight.

The NFL and the union are expected to return to Washington for another day of federal mediation on Tuesday. On Wednesday, NFL owners are scheduled to meet in northern Virginia, where they are expected to vote to lock the players out if no agreement has been reached.

Leaking details of its decertification plan could be an attempt by the NFLPA to force the owners to budge on some of the "all-important core issues" about which federal mediator George Cohen said "very strong differences remain" after seven straight days of talks that ended Thursday. After NFLPA boss DeMaurice Smith met with all NFL agents at the scouting combine on Friday, many agents said they believed those "differences" were vast, and that a lockout was certain.

Threatening to decertify - which, according to the CBA, they has to do by Thursday or it will lose the ability to do so for six months - gives the NFLPA some leverage. The union clearly wants its lockout-blocking injunction to be heard by U.S. District Court Judge David S. Doty in Minneapolis, who has had jurisdiction over the current CBA since 1993.

The reign of Doty, who has ruled many times in the union's favor, ends when the current agreement expires. Twice, NFL owners have attempted to remove Doty from his position as guardian of the CBA.

Smith has been preparing for possible decertification since last spring, when he began meeting with NFL teams and holding votes on whether to give him the authority to decertify at his discretion. All 32 teams voted to give him that power, according to union sources.

It's a powerful weapon since Smith knows the NFLPA's one big victory over the NFL came after the union decertified in 1989. That led to a suit by the late Reggie White, which ended with a settlement in 1993 that resulted in a new CBA and limited free agency for NFL players.

Smith appears to also have the support of NFL agents to decertify again, which is key because in theory Smith could lose power to individual agents if the union decertifies. During a break in the NFLPA meeting on Friday, the union purposely sent out four of the most powerful agents in the NFL - Tom Condon, Drew Rosenhaus, Joel Segal and Ben Dogra - to speak to the media and pledge their support to Smith in a show of force.

Also on Friday, NFL commissioner Roger Goodell met with the owners' 10-man negotiating committee, including Giants co-owner John Mara, to brief the panel on the negotiations and his interpretation of the union's plans, according to a league source. None of the owners was present during the seven-day mediation. It's not clear if they'll be there when talks resume Tuesday morning.



Read more: http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/footba...l#ixzz1F9gbVrjr

I've been going to post the entire history of the organization of the NFL and their negotiations with the players starting from back in 1956. But that would be soooo long. I encourage everyone to read it firsthand at NFLPlayers.com.

What I decided to post is from the 80's forward to the current CBA as NFLPlayers.com calls the negotiations in the 80's as an "Era of Change".

While reading this history I had to remind myself that this is written by the NFLPA. So it's possible that it has a slight bent towards their view of things. Still, I'm sure the history is accurate and it's a good read to see what has transpired to get us to this point.

I'm going to make a second post of "The 1990's-Growth of the Union".

The two articles of negotiation history will paint an inside picture. It should also see they why's and what for's of the Union decertifying the first time and what that accomplished.

Better still go to the link and read from 1956, The 1960's and The 1970's to get a real eye-opener of the negotiation struggles over the years.


The 1980's-Era of Change


Percentage-of-Gross Proposal

The first refusal/compensation system governing free agents in the 1977 CBA saw very little player movement because a first round draft choice (or more) was too high a price to pay for signing another team's free agent. At least that was the excuse club owners gave for not bidding on free agents from 1977 through 1981. However, the players eventually realized that the owners' practice of sharing TV and gate revenues on a nearly equal basis meant that clubs had no incentive to bid on free agents anyhow, whatever their cost in terms of draft choices. Since most stadiums were full, why would an owner bid millions for a free agent if his revenues couldn't go any higher as a result?

This realization led players to a new approach in bargaining for a new CBA in 1982. Adopted by players at an NFLPA convention in Albuquerque in March of that year, the proposal called for players to be paid 55% of the clubs' league-wide revenues. Those revenues would be divided among players based on years of service, playtime and individual and team performance. The proposal was designed to pay players based on performance, not on how high a player was drafted or how well he was expected to play.

The owners summarily rejected the percentage-of-gross proposal in early 1982, saying they didn't want players as their business partners. Through their hired gun, Jack Donlan, owners said they needed to continue determining salaries through individual negotiation, in part because a new league—the USFL—was beginning play in 1983. They argued that the USFL could "cherry pick" individual players by offering more than the percentage-of-gross system would provide them, and that they needed to be able to match or exceed USFL offers through continued negotiation with players on an individual basis.

The 1982 Strike

Collective bargaining got nowhere, so the NFLPA Board of Player Representatives voted to call a strike beginning after the second weekend of regular season games in 1982. In response, the owners shut operations down completely on September 21, 1982, and barred players from doing anything on team property. This standoff continued for almost two months, with owners remaining steadfast against any change in the system. The ultimate settlement occurred only after two things happened:

1. It appeared likely that the season would be canceled unless regular season games resumed in early November.

2. The owners agreed to a much improved salary/benefit package and guaranteed that that package would be worth at least $1.28 billion over the 1983-1987 seasons.

The players ultimately accepted the deal, but not without considerable dissension. Some teams—the Detroit Lions, Chicago Bears, and New England Patriots in particular—refused to return to practice until owners signed off on a complete agreement. Other teams—the San Francisco 49ers and New Orleans Saints, for example—were already back to practice before the tentative settlement was reached on November 16.

The 1982 CBA was eventually signed on December 5, 1982, after another three weeks of continued negotiation. When it was signed, the owners paid $60 million in "money now" benefits, which offset much of the salaries players lost while on strike. The players also gained severance pay for the first time, and increases in minimum salary, pension, pre-season pay, injury protection, and other monetary benefits. Improvements also came in the medical rights area, with players gaining the right to a second medical opinion, the right to select a surgeon for injury-related operations, and the right to inspect their club medical records.

In addition, the NFL agreed to an agent certification system whereby clubs would negotiate veteran contracts only with agents certified by the NFLPA. There was also an agreement that the NFLPA would receive copies of all player contracts so that relevant salary information could be made available to players and those certified agents.

In short, while the 1982 CBA did not change the NFL system in any significant respect, it instead increased the price the owners would have to pay to continue that system, and it assured that players would have accurate information when they attempted to negotiate their salaries within that system.

The Beginning of a Breakthrough

A simplistic account of the 1974 and 1982 bargaining efforts would say that the players fell short of their goals on both occasions. In 1974, they set out to achieve free agency, but the 1977 CBA restricted free agent movement almost as much as the old system. In 1982, they set out to achieve a defined percentage of the gross revenues and a "pay for performance" system, but the old system continued along with improved benefits.

A more enlightened view of those negotiations, however, was that the battle was never going to be won in the short term. The owners, who had their way for most of the league's history, were a powerful group that always stuck together in dealings with the players. Because they shared most of their revenues, they were unlike the Major League Baseball owners, whose internal conflicts made them less than a united front when dealing with the players union. The NFL owners could always outlast the players, since players had short careers and an inherent fear of making careers even shorter "by taking a stand."

These realities were proven again in 1987, when the NFLPA opened negotiations for a new CBA to succeed the 1982 agreement. A lot had happened in the interim. Ed Garvey left his job as Executive Director to enter politics. Gene Upshaw, who had served as NFLPA President during the 1982 strike, was a natural choice to succeed Garvey since he had experience as a player and union leader and also as a negotiator of the 1977 and 1982 agreements. The player reps unanimously elected Gene as Executive Director in June of 1983, and the organization changed significantly thereafter.

Gene's primary objective was simple—he wanted to have the players determine the goals of the organization. He worked closely with Jeff Van Note (NFLPA President 1983), Tom Condon (NFLPA President 1984-1986) and Marvin Powell (NFLPA President 1986-1988) to meet with and poll the players on their bargaining objectives in preparation for the expiration of the 1982 CBA in 1987. The results of a league-wide player survey taken in 1986 made clear that the players viewed free agency as their highest priority. This was not surprising, since only one player even got an offer from another club during the entire term of the 1982 CBA, despite the fact that over 500 players had become "free agents" under the system.

While benefits were improved in the 1982 CBA, players still had no choice as to where they would play since the system essentially prohibited free agent movement. At the same time, revenue disparities increased among the teams to the point where, unlike in 1982, an owner could increase his revenues through luxury box sales and other sources if he could assemble a winning team. In other words, free agency could work for players in 1987 if they could ever force owners to agree to it. That, however, would not be easy.

Strike: The Scab Season

Not surprisingly, the owners’ response when 1987 bargaining began was to reject the players' free agency demands. Since the USFL had gone out of business in 1986, management again had their monopoly intact, and there was no reason to abandon their "our way or no way" approach at the bargaining table without being forced to by the players. The players therefore voted in the spring of 1987 to authorize a strike, nevertheless hoping one could be avoided through compromise. But, instead of compromising, Jack Donlan, who was again the owners' spokesman, began planning for the use of replacement players in the event a strike was called. He was instructed to do so by the NFL Management Council Executive Committee ("CEC") headed by powerful Tampa Bay owner Hugh Culverhouse. Culverhouse believed that the league had been too soft on players in 1982, and fellow CEC members Tex Schramm (Dallas), Mike Brown (Cincinnati) and Bill Bidwell (Cardinals) agreed with him. Culverhouse also knew free agency would push veteran salaries up and force clubs to be more competitive. That, of course, would mean less profit for him and other owners.

Donlan appointed former Atlanta general manager and player Eddie LeBaron to head up the replacement player effort, and the "scab league" was born. When real players went on strike in mid-September of 1987, scab players recruited by LeBaron—consisting mainly of players already cut in the 1987 pre-season- filled rosters. Unfortunately, some veterans also crossed the picket line, saying they needed the money or did not believe in free agency.

Worse yet, the owners had a big financial stake with the TV networks in seeing to it that the games were televised, even it if meant using scab players. Unlike 1982, when the networks paid the owners in advance, the agreements between networks and the owners in 1987 were structured so that the only way the owners could receive TV revenue was to make sure games were played.

Even though only 15% of the real players crossed the picket line during the 1987 scab season, it became clear to the NFLPA leadership that collective bargaining could not work in dealing with the NFL monopoly. Any group that would put vastly inferior talent on the field and call it NFL football would obviously stop at nothing to defeat the players' free agency demands made under labor law.

Player reps therefore voted to end the strike, and they sent the players back to work on Thursday, October 15, 1987. The same day, however, the NFLPA filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL in federal court in Minnesota, challenging the owners' intent to continue the first refusal/ compensation system and other restrictions on players from the previous agreement.

Back to the Courts: Powell v. NFL

In obvious retaliation for filing suit, the CEC voted to deny the players' return to work for that weekend's games, choosing instead to use scab players for the third week in a row. Owners wanted striking veterans to lose yet another paycheck, so they kept them from playing even though the strike was over. The NFLPA quickly filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB, and the NLRB issued a complaint against the owners for their discrimination against striking players.

Once allowed back, the veteran players completed the 1987 season without a new agreement, and replacement players were let go. Internally, the owners declared victory, believing that the NFLPA would not have sufficient funds to sustain a legal fight. They even awarded bonuses to Eddie LeBaron and the Management Council staff for their efforts in putting the scab games together. Much animosity remained, however, between players who stayed on strike and teammates who crossed the picket line.

Meanwhile, the antitrust lawsuit—named Powell v. NFL after NFLPA President Marvin Powell—proceeded before Judge David Doty in Minnesota. Doty ruled in favor of the players in late January of 1988, saying that the 1987 bargaining impasse ended any exemption owners would have to continue their restrictive practices under the antitrust laws. The owner’s quickly appealed Doty's ruling, expressing confidence the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals would overrule it.

As a precautionary measure, the owners nevertheless implemented what became known as "Plan B," which freed players at the bottom of the roster from the first refusal/compensation system. Under the Plan B system, which was first implemented in 1989, clubs could "restrict" 37 players and continue to subject them to the first refusal/compensation system. Players who were not restricted could sign with other clubs between February 1 and April 1 without restriction. Players continued to play in 1988 and 1989 without a new CBA, believing that any system that denied free agency to the top 37 players would fail under the antitrust laws. Fortunately for the players, the NFLPA was able to finance the legal effort by substantially increasing group licensing revenues, which grew from $2 million in 1988 to over $11 million by 1990. This was possible only because the vast majority of players signed Group Licensing Authorizations, granting exclusive rights to the NFLPA.

Radical Moves—Decertification

The owners were beginning to worry in 1989, since the players won before Judge Doty in 1988 and began accumulating enough licensing revenues to sustain the legal fight if an appeal was needed. Then, owners were given a reprieve on November 1, 1989, however, when the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Doty's previous ruling for the players. The Eighth Circuit ruled that, so long as a union represented players, they had no rights under antitrust laws to sue owners. The court said that players had to choose between being a union and using their right to strike under labor laws, or relinquishing their union rights and pursing their antitrust rights as individuals in court.

Owners proclaimed victory, believing the NFLPA leadership would never have the courage to give up the NFLPA's status as a union representing players. The owners were never more wrong. Two days later, the NFLPA Executive Committee voted on November 3, 1989 to abandon the NFLPA's status as a collective bargaining agent, and players ratified the move in team meetings that followed. Players understood that the union was originally formed to protect players, but the court decision meant that continuing as a union would only protect owners from trebled damages under antitrust laws. Player reps met in Dallas on December 5, 1989, and finalized the decision by officially ending the NFLPA's status as a union.

From the last post: "Player reps met in Dallas on December 5, 1989, and finalized the decision by officially ending the NFLPA's status as a union."...


The 1990's-Growth of the Union


McNeil Case Filed

In its place, they re-formed the NFLPA as a professional association, dedicated to protecting the individual contracting rights of NFL players. The primary goal of the new organization was to pursue litigation on behalf of individual players; the new NFLPA Bylaws specifically prohibited any collective bargaining efforts.

In the spring 1990, a new lawsuit was filed on behalf of eight players whose contracts expired after the 1989 season. The lead plaintiff was Freeman McNeil of the Jets and he was joined by Don Majkowski of the Packers, Tim McDonald from the Cardinals, Niko Noga of the Lions, Mark Collins and Lee Rouson of the Giants, Dave Richards from the Chargers, and Frank Minnifield of the Browns. The lawsuit claimed that Plan B rules restricting free agents violated the antitrust laws, and that the players had a right to sue since there was no longer a union representing NFL players.

The NFLPA paid for the McNeil case, along with several other cases challenging illegal practices of the NFL. Owners, who thought they were protected by the cloak of the labor laws, argued they still should be, even though the NFLPA dropped its union status. They argued the NFLPA was just a "union in hiding," and that it just dropped its official union status to get around the Powell appellate court ruling.

Licensing Wars Begin

Meanwhile, the owners adopted another strategy that would severely threaten the NFLPA's ability to finance any court battles. Realizing that NFLPA-financed litigation could continue only if the players continued to sign NFLPA Group Licensing Authorizations and support the group licensing program, they waged an all-out effort to have their licensing arm—NFL Properties—steal players away from the NFLPA's group licensing program.

The league offered money to individual players to abandon the NFLPA and appoint NFL Properties their exclusive licensing agent. From 1990-92, NFL Properties spent in excess of $30 million in direct payments to players for group licensing rights, obviously hoping to steal enough players so that the NFLPA would not have a sufficient number of recognizable players to attract licensees. These payments were nothing more than outright bribes, since NFL Properties had no real hope of generating enough group licensing revenues to offset the payments.

Defections to NFL Properties began with a group of quarterbacks, known as the Quarterback Club, who were guaranteed $500,000 each to divert their rights to the NFL. The original group included Jim Kelly, Warren Moon, Dan Marino, Phil Simms, John Elway, Bubby Brister, Boomer Esiason, Troy Aikman, Jim Everett, and Randall Cunningham. After signing the Quarterback Club, NFL Properties signed several more superstars to six-figure deals, including Michael Irvin, Sean Jones, Steve Emtman and Ronnie Lott. Properties told players that they need not honor their GLAs since the NFLPA had abandoned its union status and no longer provided collective bargaining services. By 1992, NFL Properties was offering a minimum of $10,000 to any player who would sign up, and over 700 players did so. This trend posed a serious problem, since continued licensing income was necessary to fund the McNeil and other cases.

More Wins in Court

The legal tide turned in the players favor after the NFLPA abandoned its union status. In March 1990, an NLRB judge ruled that the owners violated labor laws when they refused to allow strikers to return for the third scab game back in 1987. This backpay award totaled about $19 million for 1,400 players affected. As usual, however, owners refused to accept defeat and appealed the case to the full NLRB in Washington.

Meanwhile, the players achieved another significant victory in the McNeil case in Minnesota, when Judge Doty ruled in spring 1991 that the NFLPA's change in status meant that the owners were no longer exempt from antitrust laws. This meant that league lawyers would have to defend the Plan B restrictions in a full-blown trial before a jury.

That trial began in June of 1992. Players finally got their day in court, even though it took almost five years to get there.

The McNeil trial was not easy. For each of the eight plaintiffs, NFL lawyers put up charts before the jury to show how many hundreds of thousands of dollars they had received in salary and bonuses over their careers. They called witness after witness—including Chuck Noll of the Steelers, George Young from the Giants and Commissioner Paul Tagliabue—to say that the first refusal/compensation system was necessary to preserve competitive balance and fan interest. The NFL spent millions on lawyers' fees and expert witnesses, and made it known that, even if they lost, they would appeal all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Jury Finds for Players

After 50 days of trial, the McNeil case finally went to the jury on September 9, 1992. After two days of deliberations, the jury announced its verdict. They found that the Plan B system violated antitrust law because it was more restrictive than it had to be to achieve competitive balance. On damages, however, the jury ruled for only four of the eight plaintiffs, awarding a total of $543,000 for Dave Richards, Lee Rouson, Frank Minnifield, and Mark Collins. Most importantly, though, the legal issue had been won, and the players finally were able to strike down the Plan B system.

Within seven days of the McNeil verdict, NFLPA lawyers filed another case for Keith Jackson of the Eagles, who had been "protected" under Plan B in early 1992 but was still unsigned when the verdict was announced. Joe Phillips of the Chargers, Garin Veris from New England, Webster Slaughter of the Browns joined Keith and several other players still unsigned at that time. In late September, Judge Doty granted the players' motion for an injunction against Plan B, making these players unrestricted free agents, free to sign with any club in the league.

The McNeil and Jackson cases represented a real turning point in the players' relationship with the league. Finally, after going through a month-long strike, a loss in the Powell case, and five years without a CBA, the players could no longer be subjected to the Plan B system. At least, that is, until and unless the owners could get the McNeil verdict reversed by an appellate court.

Settlement Talks Begin


The McNeil and Jackson victories, along with a $30 million verdict for the players in the 1989 developmental squad case (Brown v. NFL), made many NFL owners think it was time to reach a settlement with the players in. They worried about having to pay treble damages to players, especially after a class action antitrust case was filed in the name of Reggie White of the Eagles (White v. NFL) in October 1992.

Other owners, particularly Norman Braman of the Eagles who headed the NFL Properties committee, wanted to duke it out in court. That faction believed that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals would reverse Judge Doty and the jury in McNeil just as they did in the Powell case in 1989. They also believed that the NFLPA would run out of money, since more than 700 players eventually would take bribe money from NFL Properties and leave the NFLPA's group licensing program with fewer stars to attract licensees.

NFL lawyers advised owners that the players' victories in McNeil and Jackson meant only that Plan B could not continue. It did not mean that another system could not be put in its place in 1993 that could still restrict the players. For example, the owners could have implemented a "Plan C" which would subject only 30 players per team (rather than 37) to first/refusal compensation, and give all players free agency after 10 years in the league. The players would never accept such a system, but it would be different enough from Plan B that another McNeil type case would have to be filed and tried before a jury before it was found illegal. That would take years, and there would be a real question whether the NFLPA could survive long enough to finish the battle.

In short by late 1992, there was leverage on both sides. Players had managed to enjoin Plan B and were proceeding to claim treble damages for all players who had been damaged by that system. But the owners were appealing the McNeil decision and would have no liability if it were reversed. Even if McNeil was upheld, the fact that only four of the eight plaintiffs in McNeil were awarded damages meant that class action damages for all players would be tough to prove in the White case. Meanwhile, a "Plan C" could be unilaterally implemented which would still restrict free agents in 1993 and beyond.

Settlement talks therefore began in earnest in November 1992. Lawyers from both sides, along with Gene Upshaw from the NFLPA and Commissioner Tagliabue, met on dozens of occasions trying to find middle ground for settlement of the court cases. The players wanted meaningful free agency and fair damages for the plaintiffs. The league wanted a salary cap which would keep free agency from financially threatening teams in smaller markets. The players opposed a cap, saying it would unduly restrict the market.

The settlement eventually came, but only after both sides compromised. Owners agreed to free agency, but only if there was a salary cap. Players agreed to the cap, but only if player costs first exceeded 67% of league revenues. Even then, the cap would have to be high—64% of revenues—and the clubs would have to guarantee that at least 58% of revenues would be spent on players. (Historically, up until then, the players' share of revenues had averaged less than 50%). And most importantly, the owners would have to agree that there would be no cap in the last year of the deal—1999. In addition, $195 million in damages would have to be paid to settle the various court actions, including the White v. NFL class action.

A settlement was finally reached in January 1993, and submitted to Judge Doty for approval. He approved it preliminarily on February 26, 1993, and issued his final approval on August 20, 1993 after several hearings and written submissions to the Court.

A Union Again

With antitrust issues resolved through the litigation settlement, there was no longer a concern about a players' union giving the owners an exemption to the antitrust laws under the Powell case. Accordingly, the NFLPA Executive Committee (and later the Board of Representatives) voted in January of 1993 to obtain authorization from the players to again certify as a union. After a majority of players at team meetings throughout the league signed cards authorizing the action, the NLRB confirmed the NFLPA's majority status in March 1993 and it became a certified union. The purpose, of course, was to collectively bargain for new and improved benefits, grievance procedures and working conditions.

Meeting almost daily from March 31 to May 6, 1993, NFLPA negotiators eventually reached agreement on a new CBA with Commissioner Tagliabue and Harold Henderson, Executive Director of the NFL Management Council. The new Collective Bargaining Agreement was the product of hard, intensive bargaining. It had been almost twelve years since the various bargaining issues had been discussed in any detail, and it was not easy to resolve the many differences between the parties. But the CBA was tentatively agreed to on May 6, and submitted to the players for a ratification vote at team mini-camps that month.

NFLPA staff members met with 26 of the 28 teams (all but Philadelphia and Green Bay, which did not have mini-camps but were sent ratification ballots by mail), and conducted a written ballot on the proposed CBA at each meeting. The final ballot count was 952 in favor of the CBA and only 34 against, showing very strong support for the union's efforts.

Gains

The 1993 settlement gained for the players two things they had fought for but lost in previous bargaining efforts: free agency, and a guaranteed percentage of the gross revenues. Players had struck for free agency in 1974, but fell well short of the goal. Players struck for a percentage of gross in 1982, but the system remained the same. Achieving both in 1993 was therefore a significant accomplishment.

Not everyone who went on strike in 1987 and supported the NFLPA thereafter benefited directly from the new free agency system, since many of those players' careers ended before it was implemented. Unfortunately, the history of professional athletes' struggles to change the system in their favor has always been a matter of current players sacrificing for the benefit of those who would play after them.

But the 1993 settlement did achieve considerable benefits for players whose careers had ended during the battle. For example, all players' pensions, whether active or retired, were retroactively increased by 40% as a result of the settlement. Those who played prior to 1959 achieved their first pension. Also, players who played in 1989 and thereafter have collectively received $110 million in damages from the White settlement. And, backpay checks from 1987, plus 60% interest, were sent to 1987 strikers in November 1994 as a result of the 1993 settlement. Thus, the NFLPA had again met its commitment to all players, "past, present and future."

In February 1998, the 1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement was extended through at least 2003. The extension gave players a new annuity plan, salary guarantees for five-year plus players, significantly increased minimum salaries and numerous other benefits.

Why Was There A Settlement?


So why did the players' lawyers decide to settle the antitrust cases in 1993? Why did the NFLPA leadership decide to organize a union and agree to a new system in the 1993 CBA?

Quite simply, the decision to settle was based on choosing between two clear alternatives. One was to continue in court by urging Judge Doty to grant an injunction to stop the owners from continuing to restrict free agent players after their contracts expired. The other was to negotiate a compromise which would give reasonable free agency and a generous percentage of revenues to the players, in return for a mechanism to keep escalating salaries from jeopardizing teams in smaller markets.

The first alternative—pursuing the court battles—could succeed only if players, including superstars, would support NFLPA group licensing to keep revenues flowing in. Even then, the lawyers felt it was unlikely that Judge Doty would enjoin the owners from restricting all players at the end of their contracts in the future. Instead, he would more likely allow the owners to implement a "Plan C" which could still restrict a significant number of players. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals—the same court that reversed Judge Doty in the Powell case in 1989, could reverse whatever Judge Doty did.

Lawyers were nevertheless prepared to aggressively pursue this court fight, and NFLPA leaders were, too. The problem was having the continued resources to do it. By January 1993, more than 700 veterans, led by several all-pros, had taken the owners' bribes from NFL Properties, often at the urging of their agents. To make matters worse, drafted players were accepting NFL Properties' bribes even before they reported to their first training camp, making them ineligible for the NFLPA group licensing program. This battle of attrition had itself become a legal fight, with the NFLPA pursuing litigation against NFL Properties for intruding on its licensing program. It was even necessary for the NFLPA to sue individual players who had renounced their NFLPA Group Licensing Authorizations after signing with NFL Properties.

The ultimate decision to settle was, therefore, much like a player deciding on his individual contract. Does he take a multi-year deal with a big signing bonus and guaranteed money? Or does he take a one-year deal at less and bear the risk of a career-ending injury? In the 1993 settlement, the players got a multi-year deal with guarantees of 58% of the revenues and an "up-front" bonus of $195 million in litigation damages. And, more importantly, they got free agency for the first time in history.

It was not the perfect deal, but no deal ever is. At the very least, however, it put the players in a far better position than ever before. And that position will improve even more before the deal is over, since the last year of the 1998 Extension Agreement has no cap and provides for free agency after six years in the league.

Some comments from NFLPlayers.com

• Did you know that despite the recession, League attendance was down only 1% for the 2009 season?

• Did you know that contrary to Commissioner Roger Goodell's prediction that 20% of all NFL games would be blacked out in local markets in 2009, only 8.6% were, in fact, blacked out?

• Did you know that DirecTV renewed its agreement with the NFL to serve as its satellite carrier through the 2014 season for $1 billion annually, payable to the league notwithstanding a lockout?

• Did you know that in the past 20 years, NFL clubs have received more than $7 billion in taxpayer subsidies to build or renovate stadiums?

• Did you know that 100% of NFL owners have relied on taxpayer subsidies to publicly finance stadium construction, infrastructure improvements near the stadium or land development?

• Did you know that 10 NFL stadiums are 100% publicly financed and 19 are at least 75% publicly financed?

• Did you know that from the time the Arizona Cardinals' new stadium was approved in 2000 until the team moved into the facility in 2007, the franchise experienced a 159% increase in value?

• Did you know that in 2009, MNF telecasts drew 14 of the top 15 largest cable audiences of 2009?

• The rookies’ share of the salary cap has actually decreased each year since 1994.



• From a Roddy White tweet:

Roddy White
“I hate when espn commentators say this is a war between millionaires and billionaires with the cba it's like 10 players on an NFL roster that make 1 million dollars the rest of the guys make in the 100 thousands on a 53 man roster such a stupid comment…” [edited for cosmetic appearance]





CBA FACT OF THE DAY


The rookies’ share of the salary cap has actually decreased each year since 1994.








TRUTH ABOUT REVENUE SPLIT


Percentage of All Revenue (By League Year) received by Players:

Players get roughly 60% of what's defined in the CBA as "Total Revenues" after a number of categories of expense credits. Players get roughly 50% of all NFL revenues.

* 2002–51.87 %
* 2003–50.23 %
* 2004–52.18 %
* 2005–50.52 %
* 2006–52.74 %
* 2007–51.84 %
* 2008–50.96 %
* 2009–50.06 %



NFL owners should open their books to players

By Jay Rockefeller
Thursday, February 24, 2011; 8:00 PM

By nearly any measure, football in America is popular, profitable and unifying; a phenomenon that bridges race, income and geography.

So it's with some unease that I and millions of other Americans have watched as a bitter labor dispute plays out in the National Football League and the possibility of a lockout March 3 clouds the future of the next season.

Most fans follow the league's developments in the news and around the proverbial water cooler. Congress, acting in the public interest, has to keep the NFL on track because of the great benefits given to the league by federal law and taxpayer funds and because of its impact on the nation's economy.

For that reason, the House and Senate have periodically held hearings and meetings with professional sports officials and players to review issues of urgent public interest such as safety, illegal drug use and antitrust exemptions.

In this case, the prospect of a prolonged fight between owners and players has a direct bearing on the lives of millions of Americans who are caught in the middle.

How? Taxpayers who have helped to underwrite stadium construction are on the hook for bond payments for teams that might not play.

Workers in concessions, merchandise and other fields face the prospect of no income if the season doesn't start as planned.

Hotels, restaurants and local businesses that provide tens of thousands of jobs to everyday Americans might be forced to adjust hiring.

And this does not factor in the potential loss to regular fans whose American spirit is buoyed by the thrill of intense competition and team loyalty.

As chairman of the Senate committee that is charged with overseeing sports and communications issues, my approach up to this point has been deliberately hands-off.

Aside from conversations in recent months on the status of negotiations, I have kept our committee from stepping into the debate between the two sides.

I had hoped that the competitive environment and obvious high stakes could bring the two sides together. I had hoped that the owners and players could find a way to satisfactorily divide up what amounts to a $9 billion pie.

Reluctantly, I have come to the conclusion that the only way to sort out this stalemate is for the owners and the league to answer the biggest sticking point: money.

What I'd like to see from NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell and the owners is a simple display of good faith: Show the union your books. Don't keep secrets. If there are financial pressures that keep you from agreeing to the revenue-sharing plan proposed by the players, let's see the proof.

Ask a neutral third party to review your financial data, redact anything sensitive and prepare an unbiased bottom-line assessment of the league's finances.

Certainly, some owners make significant investments while managing a professional sports team and I don't want to play down their long-term expenses and obligations.

But the players deserve a good-faith effort to demonstrate that these expenses are real and not just an excuse.

Taking this simple step would answer the criticism from players that teams are extremely profitable but owners are unwilling to share the bonanza with the players who make it all possible.

The writer, a Democrat from West Virginia, is chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.

Washing Post

Dennis Manoloff, The Plain Dealer

Posted:  02/26/2011 8:38 PM

?   ?

CLEVELAND, Ohio -- Browns special teamer and receiver Josh Cribbs does not think the NFL's players and owners will reach an accord before the collective bargaining agreement expires Thursday at 11:59 p.m.

"There will be a lockout,'' Cribbs said. "The real question is: How long will it be?''

Cribbs spoke to reporters early Saturday evening before an autograph session at the Lake Erie Monsters-Grand Rapids Griffins hockey game at The Q. Cribbs was joined by Browns cornerback Joe Haden and safety T.J. Ward.

Haden was pessimistic, as well, while answering a question about Browns headquarters in Berea.

"When the lockout starts and we're not going to be able to go in there, it's going to feel different, definitely,'' Haden said. "When I'm not going to be able to go in there, it's going to feel a whole lot different. It's like, you go to work and all of a sudden you can't get in your job.''

In a  story on espn.com Friday, reporters Chris Mortensen and Adam Schefter wrote: "Absent a last-minute agreement that no one around football expects, the NFL Players Association plans to decertify by Thursday in an effort to pre-empt an owners-generated lockout, according to multiple league and union sources.

"The collective bargaining agreement says the NFLPA in effect must wait six months to decertify if it does it after the collective bargaining agreement expires.''

Mortensen and Schefter wrote that the "(NFLPA) already has obtained unanimous approval from players across the league to decertify,'' and, "The main reason for decertification would be to file for an injunction that, if granted, would prevent the owners from locking out the players. NFLPA officials and players believe that this could be the only hope to have a full NFL season next year.''

Friday evening in Cleveland, Cribbs was talking lockout, not decertification to pre-empt it.

"There's a difference between a lockout and a strike,'' Cribbs said. "A strike is from the players; a lockout is from the management.

"The players just want to play football. We wanted to leave it like it was. It wasn't us. It's up to (the owners) to decide.''

Haden said: "I know I want to play, I know my teammates want to play.''

One of the major sticking points in the negotiations is the owners' proposal of an 18-game regular season. A number of current and former players has suggested the proposal is a non-starter, that the regular season needs to remain at 16 games because of how physically demanding the NFL is. Cribbs and Haden, though, do not have a problem with 18 games if it means avoiding a protracted work stoppage.

"I think it will be an 18-game season,'' Cribbs said. "We just ask that they bend a little bit for us. Keep us healthy. Limit the amount of training camp and things of that nature. If we meet somewhere in the middle, an agreement will be reached.''

Haden said: "Eighteen games, do 18 games. I'm not worried about it.''

Cribbs said the Browns could be especially hard hit by a work stoppage because  they are breaking in a new coaching staff. Coach Pat Shurmur will install a version of the West Coast offense.

"It's going to be hard with the lockout coming up to not have OTAs and to not be able to grasp the playbook,'' Cribbs said.

Cribbs said he met Shurmur at the Greater Cleveland Sports Awards earlier this month. Cribbs was honored that night as the Greater Cleveland Sports Commission's pro athlete of the year.

"I said, 'Coach, I just want to win,''' Cribbs said. "I know he felt it. He looked right back at me and said, 'I just want to win, too.'''

Cribbs is salivating at the opportunity to expand his game in the West Coast offense. He is convinced he can be an impact receiver, regardless of system.

"(Shurmur) did mention having a lot of things planned for me,'' Cribbs said. "He's going to do everything he can to put us in position to score touchdowns and win football games. They're going to get the playmakers the football.''

On Feb. 20, fan-favorite Cribbs caused a stir on twitter from the NBA All-Star Game in Los Angeles. Cribbs tweeted that Cavaliers owners Dan Gilbert had gotten him tickets, then sent a twitpic of "My boy'' LeBron James.

Cleveland fans immediately let Cribbs know via twitter and other channels that they were not happy with his judgment. Cribbs further angered the base by tweeting that fans should let the James issue go and that "we moved on.''

"I was surprised by the reaction,'' Cribbs said. "I sent out the (twitpic), really nonchalant, so I didn't think there would be that big of a backlash. But I understand it.

"It shows how diehard the fans are. When someone (James) does that to the city, they fight back vocally. These are some of the better fans in the league and around the country.''

Cribbs said he has learned his lesson.

"I know I have to watch everything I say and everything I tweet,'' he said. "I really don't have any intention to leave, but I would think twice -- and a third time and a fourth time -- before trying to get out of Cleveland.''

PD

. Did you know that my attendance will be down 100% if there is a strike.
. Did you know that blackout will affect the economy and will spike if the season and off season are truncated as player and owners will NOT get much fan sympathy.
. Did you know that direct TV has exploded what they charge for Sunday ticket and watching a bunch of spoiled athletes and owners may not be in my budget this year.
. Did you know whatever tax subsidies owners have recieved it is not taken for granted tax payers will foot the bill yet get no revenue share in stadiums, worse, the theft known as PSLs for the mere priviledge of buying Season tickets has become common.
. Did you know with an exploding popularity Both the owners and players are spitting in the face of the reality of many of the fans lives.
>did you know a portion of fans quit watching after a strike tell the NHL and MLB for examples. With the NFL the affections are much stronger as will be the animosity as NEITHER side will get any sympathy and many fans will turn their back not buying NFL gear, Tickets, quitting Sunday Ticket.

Both sides have forgotten this is a GAME. Fans who have suffered the last 2.5 years in this poor economy have still attended games and supported this game. A strike will change that and the NFL will see a drop in revenue from advertisers, ticket sales, and many cities may listen to their taxpayers who start to say NO to publicly funded stadium. And should the worst happen like in MLB where there is no cap, then the popularity of the NFL will plummet as rich teams will buy up the major stars like the new York Yankees.
What makes the NFL the most popular sport is its competitiveness. No draft, total free agency is what the greed lawyer agents want, yet it will ruin small market teams. No One is listening to the fans.

Did you know that the only thing that matters to me is, there may not be any football?

Can't we just extend the current deal one more year, and then work on a new deal?

Here, here !!

I don't understand, why if they voided it in 2008...

...Did they wait till a month before it ends, to start negotiating...

...Oh that's right, because they want a lockout...

• Did you know that I couldn't give a rat's ass less what you think about anything?

Did you know that, when the Browns left - I managed to watch the Super bowl each year, plus a total of maybe half a playoff game each year? And I didn't really miss it?

Did you know that if there isn't a season, I'll manage just fine? I did it once, I'll do it again if that's the way it is.

Did you know that I don't care about it? As big a Browns fan as I am?

Ditto that,...but I will watch replacement ball.

I sure hope your right on that OooRah...

Week of Uncertainty and Import for N.F.L. Negotiations

By JUDY BATTISTA
NY Times
Published: February 28, 2011


With the collective bargaining agreement set to expire at the end of the day Thursday, the N.F.L. faces the most significant threat to labor peace in more than two decades. Will games be missed in September? Maybe. Does anybody know exactly how this is going to play out? No. With so many variables and moves to be made in the coming days, not even the people at the negotiating table know where it will end up by Friday.

The only thing that is certain right now is that representatives of the team owners and the players union will reconvene with the federal mediator George Cohen at 1 p.m. Eastern on Tuesday after having three days to consider their positions.

Not much movement is expected, though, because seven days of mediated sessions produced no significant progress on the critical issues. Still, neither side can afford to look as if it is not trying to get a deal done.

There is a chance the owners and the union could agree to push back the deadline for the expiration of the deal to give themselves more time to negotiate. That is certainly what agents were hoping for last week. One agent, though, said he doubted that pushing back the deadline would change the outcome because the sides remained so far apart on the revenue split at the heart of the confrontation.

“What’s the point?” he said.

If there is no extension of the deadline, the union will have to decide if it will decertify before the deal expires — they have to do it before or wait six months to file an antitrust lawsuit. Decertification renders the union unable to bargain as a unit on behalf of the players.

The union has planned for decertification for months, and the owners, figuring this was where the union was headed, filed a complaint last month before the National Labor Relations Board alleging that the decertification plan was a sham, and that it showed the union was not bargaining in good faith.

The real question is what happens if the union decertifies. The threat of decertification is leverage for players. Owners will have to decide whether to lock out anyway, which could expose them to antitrust lawsuits and damages. But the fans’ hope that the owners would impose work rules that would allow the games to go on while the issues are resolved in court over years — as has happened in previous labor disputes — may be dashed.

Two agents and one person familiar with management’s thinking said over the weekend that owners did not want to pay players while players are suing them. That means Commissioner Roger Goodell could take a hard line and tell players that if they decertify, the league will simply shut down — no games, no paychecks — unless players withdraw any lawsuits alleging antitrust violations. League officials have said repeatedly they will not use replacement players.

Owners, despite some having heavy debt from new or refurbished stadiums, are far better positioned to endure a work stoppage than most players, whose careers are brief and who are paid only if games are played.

“The union is solid — now,” one agent said, implying that it would not be so solid when paychecks stopped arriving.

Both sides have been talking about these strategies for two years. This week, they finally have to show their hands, and it is anticipated that both sides will challenge the moves of the other in court.

Hanging over all of it is the decision by Judge David Doty in Minneapolis on the union’s appeal of a special master ruling on television contracts. The union wants $4 billion in television money placed into escrow, where owners could not have access to it during a work stoppage. The union calls that money the owners’ lockout insurance, and if Doty rules in the players’ favor, they believe it tips the leverage to their side. But Sports Business Journal has reported that owners have not budgeted for using that money until the second year of a lockout.

Quote:

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until the second year of a lockout.

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This sentence made me cringe when I read it.

Quote:

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It's like a game of chicken,, first side to blink, loses.

---

I thought it was about turkeys...

Judge sides with NFL players in TV dispute

By Brian Murphy
brianmurphy@pioneerpress.com

Updated: 03/01/2011 11:18:55 PM CST


A federal judge in Minneapolis ruled Tuesday that
the NFL violated the collective bargaining agreement
with its players by renegotiating $4.78 billion in
television rights fees for team owners to tap during
a lockout even if no games are played in 2011.

The ruling by U.S. District Judge David S. Doty was a
blow to the NFL and could influence contract
negotiations between the league and Players
Association.

With billions of dollars worth of leverage at stake,
the league's collective bargaining agreement is
scheduled to expire at 11 p.m. Thursday.

Owners have vowed to lock out the players unless a
new deal is reached, which would shatter more than
23 years of labor peace in North America's most
popular sport.

Doty ruled that the NFL breached its contract with
the union by accepting below-market TV deals for
2011 that produced less revenue to share with the
players in exchange for the networks paying their
rights fees during a lockout.

"The record shows that the NFL undertook contract
renegotiations to advance its own interests and
harm the interests of the players," Doty wrote in his
28-page decision.

He overruled a special master's decision that sided
with the NFL on the matter and ordered another
hearing to determine whether the league's violation
entitles the union to monetary damages or a court
order blocking owners from collecting the TV
money.

The Players Association wants Doty to issue an
injunction and place the money in escrow pending

a new labor agreement to prevent the 32 clubs from
using the broadcast revenue as lockout insurance.

"This ruling means there is irrefutable evidence that
owners had a premeditated plan to lock out players
and fans for more than two years," George Atallah, a
ssistant executive director of external affairs, said
in a statement. "The players want to play football.
That is the only goal we are focused on."

The NFL countered with a statement playing down
the significance of Doty's decision on federally
mediated labor talks, which continued Tuesday in
Washington, D.C.

"As we have frequently said, our clubs are prepared
for any contingency, this decision included," NFL
spokesman Greg Aiello said. "Today's ruling will
have no effect on our efforts to negotiate a new,
balanced labor agreement."

The NFL has deals with NBC, FOX, CBS and ESPN
through the 2013 season and DirecTV through
2014. In 2010, the NFL earned more than $9 billion
in revenue it shared with the players — half of which
came from its TV deals, according to the union.

NFL attorney Gregg Levy argued in a hearing before
Doty last week that the league renegotiated the
agreements to broaden distribution and secure
more digital revenue. Levy also cautioned Doty that
the union wants him to issue an injunction to "put a
thumb on the scales of the collective bargaining
process," which would be "repugnant" to federal
labor laws designed to protect unions and
businesses from court intervention.

This month, Special Master Stephen Burbank
rejected the union's claim and ruled the NFL used
"sound business judgment" in renegotiating its TV
contracts, which require the league to repay the
networks rights fees with interest if games are
canceled.

Desperate to prevent owners from using the $4.78
billion to finance a work stoppage, the union
appealed Burbank's decision to Doty, who has
overseen the collective bargaining agreement since
brokering the 1993 Reggie White settlement that
established modern free agency and the salary cap.

Doty said Burbank erred by failing to recognize that
the labor agreement requires the NFL to maximize
its television contracts for the joint benefit of the
league and Players Association.

Burbank, a University of Pennsylvania law professor,
did rule that the NFL violated parts of the collective
bargaining agreement in renegotiating specific
deals with ESPN and NBC and awarded the NFLPA
$6.9 million in damages.

But it was a pittance compared to the $60 million the
union sought and the $4.78 billion earmarked for
owners next fall while the locked-out players face
life without paychecks.

Doty ordered both sides to file legal arguments
regarding damages and a possible injunction but
did not schedule a hearing date.

The NFL twice has attempted but failed to remove
Doty from his stewardship over collective
bargaining. The most recent dustup involved Doty's
2008 decision allowing Michael Vick to retain $20
million in bonuses from the Atlanta Falcons after
Burbank ruled the quarterback violated his contract
when he was convicted of fronting an illegal dog-
fighting ring.

Wow,,, Good catch Shep.....

Judge sides with NFL players in TV dispute

TwinCities.com

web page

This is helpful to the union, but I sincerely doubt enough to avert a lockout.

Even if some of this money is made available to the players, the owners are still in a stronger position to play the waiting game until the players come crawling back since they spent all their money on cars and women.

On a side note, are there any owners in this league who rely solely on their NFL franchise for income?

Don't the Yorks still own the Debartolo Corporation?

Here is a list of owners with some bio.

I haven't read all, but most give enough information to find out how they made their money.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NFL_franchise_owners

Great article about what the decertification of the union means to the current situation:

LINK
By JUDY BATTISTA
Published: March 1, 2011

WASHINGTON — With the National Football League’s players union’s agreement with owners set to expire at midnight Friday, and little progress reported in eight days of negotiations that have included a federal mediator, the union is planning to effectively dissolve itself.

Twenty-two years ago, a similar decision by the union allowed individual players to sue the league, and they won a momentous victory — the right to free agency that they still enjoy.

Instead of remaking the system the way they did in the late 1980s and early 1990s — when the union became the first and only one in a major sports league to dissolve itself — players hope to use the process known as decertification to save what they already have, by blocking owners from locking out players in a dispute over how to divide the $9 billion in annual revenue the N.F.L. generates. Union leaders say they would decertify simply as a way to get players back on the field, and to prevent a work stoppage that threatens the 2011 regular season.

If the union decertifies, owners will face a decision. They could impose their own rules that would allow the games to continue, a decision likely to expose the league to a series of antitrust lawsuits brought by players that would attack the underpinnings of the current game: the salary cap, the franchise tag that restricts movement of some free agents, and even the validity of some player contracts.

The goal would be less to alter the shape of the game than to create pressure on owners to make a deal, by arguing that the rules unreasonably restricted players’ earning power. If the players won, the owners would be subject to triple damages — a potentially devastating loss of billions of dollars. Unions cannot sue an employer for antitrust violations, which is why the National Football League Players Association could decide to decertify.

It is an unusual, and risky, maneuver for the union. Players would lose benefits and, at least for a little while, a say in how the league is run. But it already has received the necessary votes from players. A decision to dissolve could come by Thursday, hours before the current labor deal expires.

“In 1989, players were fighting for free agency,” said Gabe Feldman, the director of Tulane University’s sports law program. “They thought it necessary to exercise all their leverage. Here, I think we’re dealing with a game of chicken, and both sides are flexing their muscles trying to get the best possible deal and wait it out as long as they can before the regular season starts.”

If the union decertifies, it would operate as a trade association. With a player as a plaintiff, it would immediately file for an injunction from a federal judge seeking to stop a lockout. A hearing would likely not be heard until late March.

“The N.F.L. players have had some success with antitrust litigation strategy,” said an attorney familiar with labor relations and sports, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he does not have direct knowledge of the union’s plans. “That was how they built themselves up after the debacle of the replacement games in the 1980s. It doesn’t surprise me that that is their strategy.”

But litigation could take years and cost substantial amounts of money to work its way through court. During that time, if there was no union, there would be no way for players to negotiate on any other issue — pension, health care, even grievances.

This time around, the owners seem unlikely to let the games be played because they view them as essentially funding players’ lawsuits — the players would be earning a paycheck while the suits worked their way through the courts. Owners consider that one of the fundamental mistakes they made the last time the union dissolved.

“It is a worst-case scenario for the owners,” Mr. Feldman said.

Still, the ramifications of decertification worry N.F.L. owners enough that they are in an odd position for management — they want the union to remain intact and they will claim that decertification is a sham.

“When management says you must have a union even if you don’t want one, that tells you the world has turned upside down,” said one veteran of sports labor negotiations who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly.

The N.F.L.P.A.’s tactic could spread. The N.B.A.’s collective bargaining agreement expires at the end of this season, and the National Basketball Players Association has considered decertification as a means of combating a lockout.

Last month, the N.F.L. filed a complaint to the National Labor Relations Board claiming that the union was failing to negotiate in good faith because it was planning to decertify. The N.F.L. said that the union is engaging in “surface bargaining” and tactics designed to avoid reaching an agreement before the collective bargaining agreement expires so it can file antitrust litigation against the league to try to block a lockout. The league noted that the union had done this once before.

After the N.F.L.P.A. decertified in 1989, an action unsuccessfully challenged by the N.F.L, it acted as a trade association. It was allowed to re-form as a union and resume collective bargaining activities when a settlement with owners was finally reached in 1993, the same course the current union would likely take if it dissolves.

The N.L.R.B. has not yet ruled on the N.F.L.’s complaint. That leaves the owners likely to lock out players when the current deal expires, even if the union decertifies before then, essentially shutting down the league.

That would send everybody into uncharted sports territory. An informal agreement between owners and union officials could keep talks going. But players, who would not be paid during a lockout, could allege that the owners are engaging in a group boycott — a violation of antitrust law. Hundreds of players who are due to receive roster bonuses in a few weeks, and who would not receive them in a lockout, might argue that they should be free agents because their contracts were broken.

“Then it’s up to a federal judge whether a lockout is a massive antitrust violation,” said one lawyer with experience in labor issues who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak by his employer. “The question is, can you have a lockout if there is no union?”

Nobody knows the answer to that.

“We can’t look to settled law to try to predict what’s going to happen because this will create the law,” Mr. Feldman said. “As a sports fan, this is a terrible time. As a sports law professor, this is pretty great stuff.”

What I haven't heard is, what happens when the CBA is all signed and the NFLPA is still decertified.

1) How long does it take to re-certify
2) If there is no union, can't the NFL just say here are the rules and this is how it is going to work if you want to play football - take it or leave it all 1700 (or whatever number of players) of you?

I don't know the answer, but my guess is that #2 is what will happen. Once the union de-certifies, each player is on their own to seek employment, which means that we're back to the old days before the union.

Now, if the owners band together and operate in unison in terms of controlling the market in that environment, then they majorly open themselves to collusion and anti-trust suits from the players.

If each team remains separate and operating on their own, I don't think there is as strong of a chance of that happening. Things like TV contracts may muddy that water a little, however.

I just don't get all the definitive talk about anti-trust stuff though because it isn't as if this is the ONLY football league that players can seek to work in, and as long as the teams are not essentially doing the equivalent of price-fixing for salaries in the marketplace, then the players are then just potential workers seeking employment in a very limited market of only 32 companies.