DawgTalkers.net Forums DawgTalk Everything Else... Ofc. Nero Acquitted in Freddie Gray case...

Ofc. Nero's case is the 2nd case to have gone to trial. I'll post a link and copy the transcript of the judge's ruling. Fair warning it's a pretty lengthy read, but I think he does a very good job of laying out what the State needed to prove, what was presented, his conclusion, and why and how he came to that conclusion. On the next post I'll highlight some key points and offer my $.02 on a couple things.

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylan...0523-story.html




Circuit Judge Barry G. Williams acquitted Officer Edward Nero on Monday of all four charges against him in connection with the arrest of Freddie Gray.

Below are his full comments from the bench, as transcribed by The Baltimore Sun.

WILLIAMS: All right, this court has been asked to render a decision in this matter and will give the information as follows.

The state has charged the defendant with assault, misconduct in office by corruptly performing an unlawful act, reckless endangerment and misconduct in office by corruptly failing to do an act that is required by the duties of his office.

In order to convict the defendant of assault, the state must prove that the defendant caused offensive physical contact with Freddie Gray, that the contact was a result of an intentional or reckless act of the defendant, and was not accidental, and that the contact was not legally justified.
Freddie Gray case: Baltimore Police Officer Edward Nero found not guilty of all charges
Freddie Gray case: Baltimore Police Officer Edward Nero found not guilty of all charges

In order to convict the defendant of misconduct in office, the state must prove that the defendant was a public officer, that the defendant acted in his official capacity, and that the defendant corruptly did an unlawful act. For this count the state alleges that the defendant arrested Freddie Gray without probable cause.

In order to convict the defendant of reckless endangerment, the state must prove that the defendant engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another, that a reasonable person would not have engaged in that conduct, and that the defendant acted recklessly.
Reaction to the verdict in the Officer Nero trial

Rev. Westley West, attorney Billy Murphy and others react to the verdict in the Officer Edward Nero trial. (Jerry Jackson and Kenneth K. Lam/Baltimore Sun video)

Finally, in order to convict the defendant of the second count of misconduct in office, the state must prove that the defendant was a public officer, that the defendant acted in his official capacity, and that the defendant corruptly failed to do an act required by the duties of his office. For this count the state alleges that the defendant failed to ensure the safety of Freddie Gray by failing to secure Mr. Gray with a seat belt during the process of Mr. Gray being transported in a police vehicle while he was in police custody.

The state has a burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crimes charged. If the state fails to meet that burden for any element of a crime this court is required to find the defendant not guilty of that crime.

I will discuss each allegation in order.

Again, the defendant is charged with the crime of assault. In order to convict the defendant of assault the state must prove that the defendant caused offensive physical contact with Freddie Gray. The defendant acknowledges that any unwanted or unwarranted contact can be considered offensive, and the evidence is clear that at no point did Mr. Gray want to be touched by any of the officers.

Two, that the contact was a result of an intentional or reckless act of the defendant and was not accidental. Clearly when the defendant touched Mr. Gray it was done intentionally, but for reasons that I will soon discuss, I find that it was not reckless but acknowledge that is not the end of the analysis.

And finally, that the contact was not legally justified.

In order to assess whether the contact was not legally justified, it is helpful to discuss some of the facts presented at trial. All times mentioned are on the morning of April 12, 2015.

At 8:40:03, video time stamp 1:15 of Exhibit 41, shows the defendant coming down an alley, and at 8:40:10, video time stamp 1:35, it shows Officer Garrett Miller on foot and the defendant on bike riding over to the area where Mr. Gray is ultimately detained. At 8:40:13, there is a call over KGA [police radio], which is Exhibit 40, where either Miller or the defendant calls out "We got one." Miller testified that he apprehended Mr. Gray and that Mr. Gray gave up without a fight and did not resist. He testified that the defendant did not touch Gray at any time prior to the time Miller approached and detained Gray. By the time Miller cuffed Gray, the defendant was standing to their left at the ramp. While Miller believed that the defendant was ready to assist because they work together, he reiterated that the defendant did not have anything to do with the cuffing and initial detention.

While Miller detained Mr. Gray at the handicap ramp, he told the defendant to go retrieve Miller's bike, which Miller had left in the court when he got off his bike to chase Mr. Gray. As Exhibit 56 and 41 both show the defendant getting on his bike at 8:40:21, video time stamp 14 seconds and 4:37 respectively, and approximately 20 seconds later, Exhibit 41 shows the defendant walking with two bikes toward the area where he ultimately met with Miller and Mr. Gray. I note that the video does not show Miller and Mr. Gray at the corner at that time. Finally, Exhibit 41 shows Miller walking towards the corner with Mr. Gray at 8:40:52, video time stamp 5:16.

The state concedes that pursuant to Wardlaw and Terry, that Miller had a right to stop Mr. Gray, but, based on the KGA tape, part of the defendant's statement, and part of Miller's statements referenced at trial, wants this court to find that the defendant was an integral part of the initial detention and subsequent arrest of Mr. Gray. Officer Miller, who testified under a grant of immunity from the state, stated unequivocally while on the stand and under oath that he was the one who detained and handcuffed Mr. Gray, that he was the one who walked Mr. Gray from the handicapped entrance to the wall where the defendant met him after retrieving Officer Miller's bike.

Mr. Brandon Ross clearly stated that it was not the defendant who was with Mr. Gray initially, but another bike officer. Mr. Ross saw the defendant with two bikes walking towards Mr. Gray and the other officer, and this was after the bike officer cuffed Mr. Gray. There's no value for Brandon Ross to say this because he is not a friend of the defendant. He saw what he saw, and it corroborates the testimony of Miller stating that he and he alone was involved in detaining, cuffing and taking Mr. Gray to the wall to await transport; and it is consistent with the statement of the defendant, where he stated that he went to get the bikes and met Miller and Mr. Gray at the opening of the court. This is corroborated by state's Exhibit 41, which shows the defendant walking with two bikes.

The testimony that was presented from Miller and the interview with the defendant, where both indicated that "we" handcuffed, is more in line with the habit of Baltimore City Police officers who testify to speak in terms of what was done by the collective, and not necessarily what is done by the individual. Therefore the court does not find that the use of the term "we" implicates the defendant in either participating in the initial detention of Mr. Gray or the subsequent decision to arrest Mr. Gray.

The court finds that the only contact that the defendant had with Mr. Gray at the first stop, at Presbury Street, occurred when he interacted with Mr. Gray after Miller walked him to the area to await the van. By that time the Wardlaw/Terry stop had been affected by Miller, and only Miller. It was Miller who detained Mr. Gray, it was Miller who cuffed Mr. Gray, and it was Miller who walked Mr. Gray over to the area where the defendant met them.

When the detention morphed into an arrest, the defendant was not present. As such, the court rejects the state's theory that the defendant was involved in the arrest, because, absent "I" and "we," there are no credible facts to show that he was involved in the touching of Mr. Gray before Miller brought him to the corner.

Furthermore, the court does not find, with the facts presented, that there was a duty on the part of the defendant to ask any questions of Miller before he assisted with the continued detention and ultimate arrest of Mr. Gray. The defendant was aware of the KGA call from Rice, knew that Miller had detained Mr. Gray and moved him from one area to another, and that a van had been summoned. For the same reasons, minus the van call, the defendant did not have a duty to make an inquiry of Mr. Gray.

Since the defendant's contact with Mr. Gray came after Mr. Gray was detained by Miller, this court finds that the contact by the defendant was legally justified and not reckless. Therefore, as alleged by the state, there's no assault by the defendant.

Next the state alleges that the defendant corruptly arrested Mr. Gray without probable cause and that the arrest rises to the level of misconduct in office. Misconduct in office is corrupt behavior by a public official in the exercise of his duties of office, or while acting under color of law.

In order to convict the defendant, the state must prove, 1: that the defendant was a public officer; 2, that he acted in his official capacity; and 3, that he corruptly did an unlawful act. There is no question that elements 1 and 2 of the misconduct charge are met, since the defendant was a public officer acting in his official capacity on the day of Mr. Gray's arrest.

But, as noted, the court does not find that the defendant detained Mr. Gray at the ramp, nor does the court find that any actions by the defendant turned the detention into an arrest. The court does find, based on a review of exhibit 41, the testimony of defendant, Mr. Ross and Mr. Miller that the initial contact concerning detention and arrest occurred when Miller, acting alone, interacted with Mr. Gray.

As such, this court does not find that the defendant detained or arrested Mr. Gray without probable cause. The propriety and basis for Miller's actions are not before this court, and therefore have not been assessed by this court.

The state has indicated its belief that the facts, as presented, lend themselves to the application of accomplice liability for all the charges, and the defendant should be held criminally liable for the actions of Miller and others as an accomplice. In order to convict the defendant of any of the charges under the theory of accomplice liability, the state would have to prove that a crime occurred, and that the defendant, with the intent to make the crime happen, knowingly aided, counseled, commanded, or encouraged the commission of the crime, or communicated to the primary actor in the crime that he was ready, willing and able to lend support if needed. The state's theory from the beginning has been one of negligence, recklessness and disregard for duty and orders by this defendant. There has been no information presented at this trial that the defendant intended for any crime to happen, nor has there been any evidence presented that the defendant communicated any information to a primary actor that he was ready, willing and able to lend support if needed to any crime.

Since the assault and misconduct are based on a detention and arrest that this court has already determined was affected by Miller acting alone, and on the information provided over KGA, and especially where there is no conspiracy charged, this court does not find that accomplice liability on the charge of assault and misconduct is an appropriate application of the law.

I will now discuss the charges of reckless endangerment and misconduct in office.

The state alleges that the next two criminal acts occurred at what is referred to as the second stop. After Mr. Gray was placed in the van at the first stop, he was driven a block or so away, to the Mount Street location, where the van was met by the defendant, Miller, Rice and other officers.

When the van driver opened the door, Mr. Gray was seated. Rice and Miller took Mr. Gray out of the van. Miller retrieved his cuffs, replaced them with flex cuffs, and placed shackles on Mr. Gray.

At this point, allegedly Mr. Gray had gone limp, so to get him back into the van, Rice got into the van and pulled Mr. Gray by the shoulders while the defendant had Mr. Gray's leg.

At 3 seconds of Exhibit 35, which is the video by Mr. Ross, the video shows the defendant kneeling down and placing his hands on Mr. Gray's lower body. By 11 seconds, his hands are off, and at 13 seconds, Rice jumps out of the van.

The state alleges that the failure of the defendant to seatbelt Mr. Gray once he was placed back in the van rises to the level of reckless endangerment and misconduct in office. In order to convict the defendant of reckless endangerment, the state must prove that the defendant engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of death of serious physical injury to another, that a reasonable person would not have engaged in that act, and that the defendant acted recklessly.

Reckless endangerment focuses on the action of the defendant and whether or not his conduct created a substantial risk of death or injury to another. The crime occurs when the actions are found to be unreasonable under the circumstances presented. It does not focus on the end result, which can be, if charged, a separate crime.

Two questions are at issue here.

Question 1: Could an officer similarly situated as the defendant reasonably rely on the fact that an officer in the van with the detainee could and would if required seat belt the detainee, especially when that person is a superior office?

Question 2: Could an officer similarly situated as the defendant reasonably assume and rely on the fact that the transport officer, who presumably has custody, would and could make sure that the detainee now inside of his van is properly secured before driving off.

The answer to both of those questions, based on the facts presented, is yes.

As to the reasonableness of not taking steps to seat belt Mr. Gray, this court finds that a reasonable officer in the defendant's position, and in particular the defendant, could reasonably assume that an officer, superior or not, in the back of the van would make a determination as to whether seat belting was appropriate under all the facts that that officer was aware of at that moment.

This court does not find that a reasonable officer similarly situated to the defendant, at the point where there are people coming out on the street to observe and comment, would approach the lieutenant who just got out of the van to tell him to seat belt Mr. Gray or make an inquiry concerning the issue of whether or not Mr. Gray has been seat belted. There is no evidence that this was part of his training, and no evidence that a reasonable officer would do the same.

While the state did not present clear evidence of any protocol in the approximately 1,500 pages of general orders or directives concerning transfer of custody from an arresting officer to a transporting officer, a review of Policy 1114, Exhibit 2, published on April 3, 2015, which may not have gone into effect until after the incident in question, does shed some light on the issue. Policy 1114 requires that when a person is taken into custody, members shall ensure the safety of a detainee. Section 1.5 of the policy notes that whenever a detainee is transported in a police vehicle, one must make sure that the detainee is searched and handcuffed by the arresting member before being placed in a transport vehicle, and the transporting officer must also search each detainee prior to placing him in the transport vehicle.

The policy goes on to state that all passengers shall be restrained by seatbelts. This court has to assume that "member" and "one" is in reference to police officers who are required to follow general orders. The policy seemingly uses police vehicle, police transport vehicle, and transport vehicle interchangeably. The court notes there certainly could be differences that could be relevant, but not definitional terms were presented during the trial by the state.

It is certainly reasonable to believe that before a vehicle pulls off, the officer who is charged with transporting a detainee may have a duty to make sure that the person being transported is properly secured and if not seek help from other officers if there is a need to do so.

However, this court acknowledges that there may be circumstances where that duty may shift or be nonexistent in relation to a particular officer. But again, this court is making its decision only on what has been presented for this trial for this defendant.

Having found that a reasonable person would act similarly to the defendant, the court does not find that his actions were reckless, and therefore finds that there is no criminal liability under the theory that the defendant's failure to act recklessly endangered Mr. Gray.

Finally, there is a misconduct charge stemming from the stop on Mount Street.

The state alleges that the defendant failed to ensure the safety of Mr. Gray when he failed to seat belt him after Mr. Gray was placed back in the van. As stated previously, misconduct in office is corrupt behavior by a public official in the exercise of his duties of office or while acting under the color of law.

In order to convict the defendant, the state must prove that the defendant was a public officer, that he acted in his official capacity, that he corruptly failed to do an act required by the duties of his office.

Again, there's no question that elements 1 and 2 of the misconduct charge are met since the defendant was a public officer acting in his capacity as a law enforcement officer on the day of Mr. Gray's arrest.

Here, unlike on the other misconduct charge, the state asserts that the defendant failed to do an act required by his office, and that failure to act is corrupt behavior, and therefore the defendant should be convicted of misconduct.

Along with the analysis this court used to determine whether the defendant was guilty of reckless endangerment, I also must determine whether under this statute he corruptly failed to do an act required by the duties of his office.

While this court has already determined that the defendant is not guilty of reckless endangerment based on the facts presented, I believe I still must determine whether he corruptly failed to do an act that is required of his office.

The comments to the Maryland pattern jury instructions note that the committee chose not to define or explain "corrupt" or "corruptly," believing that the words communicate their meaning better than a definition would.

A review of relevant case law shows that a police officer corruptly fails to do an act required by the duties of his office if he willfully fails or willfully neglects to perform the duty. A willful failure or willful neglect is one that is intentional, knowing and deliberate. A mere error in judgment is not enough to constitute corruption, but corruption does not require that the public official acted for any personal gain or benefit.

In order to fail to perform a duty, the defendant had to know about this duty.

Out of the more than 1,500 pages of the general orders, at best, there seems to be ambiguity on the issue of when custody is transferred concerning someone who has been arrested and is about to be transported by the non-arresting officer.

Again, the court does not find that the defendant was the one who placed Mr. Gray under arrest, but clearly the defendant was involved in placing Mr. Gray back into the van after Miller recovered his handcuffs and placed shackles on Mr. Gray.

The state presented Exhibit 7, which is a document that showed on June 26, 2012, the defendant, when he was appointed as a police trainee, acknowledged receipt of nine listed items, including the general orders. It does not say in what format they were provided, but there was testimony that generally it was presented on a flash drive. I do note that this form crossed out police commissioner's memorandums.

It appears to be a given that any member of an organization is required to follow the rules of that organization once one is aware of the rules.

Defense Exhibit 10 is general order A2, which is titled "Departmental Written Directives."

Under the general information section, it states in part that employees shall be responsible for complete familiarity with and adherence to written directives, general orders and police commissioner memoranda.

As directed, written directives shall be maintained by employees in their general manuals. It goes on to say that digital versions of general orders and police commissioner's memoranda shall be distributed in a PDF file via email. Simultaneously, hard copies of directives shall be printed and distributed to each member. New directives shall require all supervisors to communicate the content of the new directive to their subordinates at roll call.

There was no evidence presented to this court that at any time between 2012 and the date of this incident, that the defendant's general orders were ever updated pursuant to the policy presented in general order A2. There is no evidence that he was ever given any information at roll call.

This is not to say that the Baltimore City Police Department does not follow general order A2 concerning the dissemination of new orders and updates, just that it was not presented to this court at this trial.

The audits in Exhibit 20 and 21 concerning seat belting individuals in prisoner transport vehicles was presented to this court, but clearly they were directed towards transport drivers and what they do by the time they get to Central Booking. The exhibits had nothing to do with what is done on the streets in an active situation.

The state points to Exhibit 22, which shows that at 6:01 p.m. on April 9, 2015, the defendant's police email account received, among other documents, amended Policy 1114. Policy 1114 amended K14, purportedly to take away discretion when seat belting a detainee.

Andrew Jaffee, who is the director of IT for the police department, stated that the emails containing new policies was sent out as a blind copy to all officers under All BPD, which is a distribution group that includes over 3,000 people. He had no way of knowing if it was opened or read by the defendant, and it was not listed as high priority.

The state entered three emails authored by the defendant on April 9, 2015, as evidence that he was using his email account on that day. I note that Exhibit 23 was sent at 1:28 p.m., Exhibit 24 was sent at 1:39 p.m., and Exhibit 25 was sent at 2:16 p.m. The state did not present any evidence to show the defendant used his email at any time between 2:16 p.m. and 6:01 p.m., and certainly did not present any evidence to show that he had used it after 6:01 p.m. on the 9th of April, 2015.

Concerning the training that the defendant received in the area of transport, Exhibit 27 is the defendant's arrest and control performance evaluation from his time at the academy. The state presented Officer Adam Long, who instructed the defendant on the issue of placing a person into a vehicle and how to seat belt them.

In the 80-hour course, Long noted that there were a number of modules taught and that the defendant passed the section for placing a suspect into a vehicle. He did not state that there was separate training for placing someone into a transport wagon or van. He said there was no specific training for wagon drivers, but noted after the incident with Mr. Gray, there is now.

Sgt. Charles Sullivan from the Western District was assigned as the defendant's field training officer in 2012. Field training is 10 weeks, but he had the defendant for a few weeks less but did not know why.

When asked about wagon training, he stated that he did not train the defendant on transport wagon or transporting prisoners even though it was part of the required training. If he had, he would have used a van and showed him how to transport a prisoner. This was never done.

A review of Exhibit 9, which is the defendant's police training manual, shows that Sgt. Sullivan initialed most of the areas where there is proof that the defendant completed a required task. Sullivan stated that if there was no check next to the area, the defendant did not complete the task. Sgt. Sullivan would have referred the defendant to general orders if it was something that he trained him on; if he did not train him, he would not have referred him to the general orders.

Brenda Vicenti, who was the field training coordinator, admitted that she was not a trainer. In the area where it is noted for arrest procedures/processing prisoners in Exhibit 9, the very subject matter where the defendant would have received training for the issue at hand, she indicated she did not train him.

She and the defendant initialed review, but this was done because she was told to do so by someone at the academy, and believes that the defendant did the same.

The court is not satisfied that the state has shown that the defendant had a duty to seat belt Mr. Gray, and if there was a duty, that the defendant was aware of the duty.

This court finds that the state has failed to meet its burden to show that the defendant corruptly failed to do an act required.

The court also finds that, under the facts presented, accomplice liability does not apply for the charges of reckless endangerment and misconduct.

Based on the evidence presented, this court finds that the state has not met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all required elements of the crimes charged. Therefore, the verdict for each count is not guilty.

This court is in recess.

Like I said, a pretty lengthy read. I found it easier to read on the original web page. I've talked before about legal standards and considerations and this is a very good job by the judge illustrating those very things.

Now some of the key things to take away from this ruling is that Nero was charged with I believe were the most minor of offenses associated with this case, all misdemeanors?. These should have been the easiest things to prove and yet the prosecution didn't even come close. What did them in mostly was that they tried to argue holding Nero to legal standards that don't exist:

The first being that Nero was an accomplice to the initial arrest and detention of Gray. The problem with this is that Nero showed up to the scene after Gray had been chased, caught, cuffed, and moved to a spot awaiting transport. The law allows an officer to act based upon information provided by another officer in good faith that what they are being told is accurate and true.

The second was that arresting Gray w/o Probable Cause amounted to an assault. There is a lot wrong with this concept as well. To begin, the prosecution was trying to get the judge to rule on something that was outside the scope of this trial, that being whether or not there was sufficient probable cause to arrest Gray. There is only 1 case of the 6 where that will be ruled on, and that would be in the trial of Miller who first jumped out on Gray, gave chase, and took him in to custody. Everyone else AFTER (van driver, etc) that will be considered to be acting in good faith that the his detention in the first place was legal and proper.

The other half is that it constitutes an assault. The judge lays out what those elements are and he had a very difficult time trying to get the prosecution to clarify what they meant. They initially posited that any arrest determined to have insufficient probable cause should be a criminal assault but later walked it back to situations where there was clearly no probably cause. The thing with this is that if Gray was arrested and there blatantly was no violation of the law, there's already laws governing that to include unlawful arrest on up to kidnapping. But what they originally were pushing for was also a problem because there are any number of reasons a judge may not find probable cause in a case. It still doesn't mean the arrest was unlawful or malicious. For exmaple, I had a probable cause hearing on a DWI case this morning. The defense attorney tried to argue that due to the defendant's weight, she could not be expected to perform certain sobriety tests, her weight being the reason for a lack of balance vs. alcohol impairment. Her BAC was a .12. Had I also not discovered half a bottle of vodka under her seat and made a couple of other observations, the judge possibly would have ruled in his favor. That ruling would have tossed the case due to a lack of probable cause. Does anyone here believe that had the judge ruled that way that I should be looking at jail time for it? The prosecutors in Baltimore seem to think so.

And based upon the judge's findings, I think I can argue that there was no probable cause to charge and arrest Nero. Should the DA be charged criminally now?

Some of the other stuff got in to whether or not Nero was up to speed on departmental policy in regards to seat belting and whether or not it was his specific responsibility. The judge found that a) he was not up to speed but more importantly b) it was someone else's (the driver's) responsibility.

But even if he found he was up to speed and it was his responsibility, departmental policy is NOT law. Not following policy can get you fired and easily lose you a civil lawsuit, but they still have to prove that it would rise to the level of criminal negligence which is a higher burden to prove.


Some of the pundits are saying not to much in to this ruling as indicative of the States overall case against the 6 officers, but as I said in the beginning, this should have been the easiest to prove and they failed miserably at it. What makes it doubly worse is that they failed so miserably on evidence that THEY put forth.

The first trial involving more serious charges ended in a hung jury, and this one was an acquittal on all counts. If the State had a strong case I'd have thought we'd have seen something of it by now. Mosby has already had to reduce and drop certain charges prior to the trials becuase she didn't have enough. But this is what happens when you charge people according to the wishes of the mob and not the law.

So it's basically a repeat of the Trayvon Martin ruling. As in the prosecution completely bungled a very winnable case.

I hope this helps many in pursuing police brutality cases. Take more time, and show the evidence that actually shows how the officer(s) acted in poor judgment.

dude's track history says the arrest itself wasn't even remotely the issue. the prosecutors screwed that up. i think we can all agree on that.

but the shadiest of his death has and will always be a concern within the community.

If you are trying to say this is a slam dunk case, then you are wrong. If it was a slam dunk, the prosecutor would not have charged these cops with every offense she could think of. She over charged this case with the hope she'd get a conviction on at least one charge. The prosecutor has no evidence on when the injury happened or who inflicted the injury. Therefore, Gray could have accidentally inflicted the injury on himself by standing in the police van and falling. As it was a procedural rule instead of a law to buckle in detainees, the police can not be charged with breaking a law.

As for the 'unlawful arrest' part of this case, the SC has already determined that if a person runs from police in a high crime area, they have reasonable cause to pursue and arrest. The prosecutor will never get a conviction on unlawful arrest.

The actual problem with this case is that the prosecution never had enough evidence to charge the police involved, and only charged them to appeal to the rioters and SJWs demanding 'justice'. So far, they have found justice in one case, and the other cases will probably have the same outcome.

I just wonder how he came out of the van in a coma. Nothing ever seemed to address that.

Root Cause...

Sometimes Criminals get hurt or killed doing what they do.

Advice...

Don't be a Criminal.

You seem to know. You've already come to conclusion that it was inflicted upon him.

Freddie Gray, aside from being drug dealer, was also known to commit fraud by way of injuring himself in order to sue for additional damages in things like car accidents. The injuries he had in this incident to his neck/spine, were the same type of injuries he had prior to the incident. Anyone who is old can tell you, it doesn't take a whole lot to aggravate or re-injure yourself. You and I may not be stupid enough to throw ourselves handcuffed in the back of a metal van, but hard as it is to believe, there are people who will looking for that payday.

BTW, there was also another arrestee who's initial statement was that Gray was banging around...

Now, if it turns out to be case where he wasn't buckled in and they gave him a "rough ride" i.e. speeding over speed bumps, sharp turns, brake checking him... then there is a case.

I truly had no idea about his prior history. That shines a light on this.

And I would agree with you that with something like this there absolutely need to be answers.

The saddest thing about all this, whether these guys did something wrong or they didn't, this prosecutor Marilyn Mosby has completely undermine the process.. be it over and inappropriately charging the officers or the fact that she and her office did not do a complete and thorough investigation prior to moving forward. All tpo appease a mob and for personal political gain.

In all fairness I'll work on providing references for my statements.

I agree completely. Her job is to present facts and properly argue the case.

Her bloodlust for revenge single handily screwed the case up....and maybe that's a good thing.

This in regards to his past history of fraud

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylan...0806-story.html

And one for my claim about the other arrestee.Now I will be forthcoming and say that there was some controversy in regards to his statement. Some say he he backtracked from his original statement to police. I included this link of him clarifying his position for balance.



http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2015/04/30...ks-his-silence/

Are you sure it was for revenge? Or CYA? Her husband is/was the city councilman where the incident took place. About a month prior to the incident, Marilyn Mosby directed BPD to step up drug enforcement in that area.

Now, regardless of what kind of dirt bag Gray was, he still had Rights and that does need to be looked in to. But it's another thing to to make claims (and be credible) that a legal system is stacked against black minorities when the black councilman has his wife, a black prosecutor tell the black police commissioner to increase enforcement in a neighborhood that will effect mostly black people.

I don't think for an instant that she was motivated by bloodlust or revenge. She would have no reasonable empathy for Gray as he was exactly the type of person the citizens complained to their councilman about.

But I'm starting to stray away from the case and to the politics/social commentary which I was trying to avoid in this thread. SOrry!

Whether she had alterior motives or not, that's the persona she chose to display during this proceedings.

A major case like this elevates her status, especially if she would've ended up winning the case.

But whatever it was, she screwed this up beyond belief.

Most recent trial results:

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-goodson-analysis-20160623-story.html

------------

After prosecutors suffered a crushing defeat Thursday in the trial of Baltimore Police Officer Caesar Goodson Jr., legal analysts say their chances of securing a conviction against any of the police officers charged in the arrest and death of Freddie Gray look increasingly dim.

Goodson, who faced the most serious charges in Gray's death — including a count of murder — was the second police officer acquitted by Circuit Judge Barry Williams. A third officer's trial ended in a mistrial when the jury deadlocked.

Prosecutors reviewing a similar string of defeats might be expected to cut their losses and drop some or all of the outstanding charges, said Steven H. Levin, a former federal prosecutor. But he predicts State's Attorney Marilyn J. Mosby will press ahead with the four trials that remain.

"A responsible prosecutor could easily justify withdrawing charges based on new evidence," said Levin, now a defense attorney in Baltimore. "I think people ordinarily would accept that. But in this case, Mosby raised people's expectations."

A gag order prohibits Mosby and the other lawyers in the cases from talking about the outcome.

Gray, 25, died last April after suffering a severe spinal cord injury in police custody. Six police officers were charged in his arrest and death; all have pleaded not guilty.
Resignation over Goodson verdict, and the larger problems raised by death of Freddie Gray
Resignation over Goodson verdict, and the larger problems raised by death of Freddie Gray

When Williams acquitted Officer Edward Nero last month, he tailored his findings narrowly, leaving the possibility that he could still find Goodson or other officers guilty. But the judge's ruling in Goodson's case was more expansive, leaving little opportunity for prosecutors to assemble evidence against the other officers that would convince him that a serious crime was committed when police arrested Gray and drove him to a police station.

Williams asked whether any officer could have known the extent of Gray's injuries in time to help him — a question that casts doubt on the viability of manslaughter charges against three other officers. The judge was skeptical about the significance of Gray's not being secured with a seat belt in the van.
Freddie Gray case: Officer Caesar Goodson Jr. not guilty on all charges
Freddie Gray case: Officer Caesar Goodson Jr. not guilty on all charges

After Williams acquitted a second officer, analysts now expect the rest to opt for bench trials. Prosecutors could seek to have Williams removed from the cases, but such a move is rarely successful.

Goodson drove the van in which Gray was transported from his arrest in Sandtown-Winchester to the Western District police station. He was charged with second-degree depraved-heart murder, three counts of manslaughter, second-degree assault, reckless endangerment and misconduct in office.

Goodson's trial provided the broadest examination of the evidence to date. It was considered prosecutors' best hope of securing a conviction.

"All I saw here was their best case wasn't a case," said Brian Murphy, a Baltimore defense attorney. Now, he said, it seems unlikely that prosecutors will have any new evidence to bring to bear.

The cases have turned on judgment calls made by police, and the responsibilities officers have to the people that they arrest.

J. Amy Dillard, a law professor at the University of Baltimore, said each trial has revealed more about what can be considered reasonable police conduct.

"These have always been hard cases to prove," she said. "And with every hung jury and acquittal, they get harder."

But Doug Colbert, a law professor at the University of Maryland, said prosectors have enough evidence to move forward, and that having trials ensures that police are subject to public scrutiny.

"Transparency becomes useful to informing the public as to the reasons why an outcome resulted," he said. "It's part of the democratic and constitutional process."

The next officer scheduled to go on trial is Lt. Brian Rice, the most senior officer charged and the one who initiated the encounter with Gray.

Colbert said the case against him could reveal new details about what happened on the morning Gray was arrested.

Gray's death sparked days of demonstrations. On the day he was buried, the city descended into riots.

Mosby's announcement of charges against the six officers helped to calm the city. But from the start, the cases have faced challenges.

Mosby said state law allowed Gray to carry a knife that officers found on him, and so he should not have been arrested. Police and attorneys for the officers pushed back hard, saying the knife was illegal under city ordinances, so the arrest was legitimate.

The manslaughter charges against four of the officers and the murder charge faced by Goodson relied on an unusual legal theory about the defendants' inaction.

That set a high bar for prosecutors. In Goodson's case, Williams said, they did not manage the leap.

Williams spent much of his time on the bench Thursday proposing alternative times when Gray might have suffered his injury, and expressed doubt about whether an officer who did not have extensive medical training would have noticed that Gray was badly hurt.

That finding was important because the murder and manslaughter charges against Goodson rested on the allegation that he knowingly failed to intervene.

David Jaros, a law professor at the University of Baltimore, said that given Williams' summary of the evidence, it's difficult to see how the judge could conclude that any of the other officers should have known that Gray was hurt.

"This case has revealed the really significant challenges to getting a criminal conviction for these charges," Jaros said. "The same challenges exist for the other defendants. In fact, they may be greater."

So at this point State's Attorney Mosby is 0 for 3... with one case, the first, ending up in a hung jury and slated for re-trial. In this case the officer chose to have a bench trial i.e. have the case heard and decided by a judge vs. a jury, and this was the same judge who ruled in the previous case in this thread.

Very smart move to waive a jury trial. Less likely to have their case be decided by emotion and social pressure.

Goodson was the officer who drove the van and had been charged with the most serious charges, 2nd degree "depraved heart" murder. What personally I find quite disturbing in all this is that the judge hasn't just said the prosecution hasn't "quite" met their burden... the judge has said in no uncertain terms that they had nothing to begin with. It is possible that you can find probable cause to charge someone but not have enough evidence for "beyond a reasonable doubt"... but if a solid investigation is done, there really isn't a far leap from one to the other. But here we've seen case after case a basic review of the evidence shows that there wasn't even PC. And given Mosby's behavior from the beginning, she's very likely to lose all 6 defamation lawsuits the officers have filed against her.

And so far this hasn't been a case of there being evidence that the officers did anything criminal and the prosecution just bungled it. The defense hasn't had to do anything tricky or fancy in the least bit. The only thing they've done is point out that what the prosecution puts forth as evidence doesn't actually support what the prosecution is claiming.

Mosby has failed because she sought justice for Grey and the crowd that gathered for her speech. She sought justice under the false idea that justice would be given to those who she thought were wronged, and she had a predetermined outcome based on her biases. Justice is blind, and for the most part, it's fair. She never had the evidence for her burden of proof, and overcharged to get a conviction on something.