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Netanyahu decided on Iran war last year, then sought to recruit Trump

The Israeli prime minister had set in motion plans to attack Iran long before President Trump began efforts to resolve nuclear concerns through negotiations, officials say.

JERUSALEM — In the fall, long before President Donald Trump embarked on an effort to resolve concerns over Iran’s nuclear program through negotiations, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had already set Israel on the road to war, according to current and former Israeli officials.

After Israel decimated Iran’s air defenses in a missile skirmish and crippled its main ally, Hezbollah, in October, Netanyahu issued a general order to prepare for a strike, the current and former officials said. Israeli intelligence officials began huddling to compile lists of dozens of Iranian nuclear scientists and military leaders who could be targeted for assassination. Israel’s air force began to systematically take out air defenses in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq to clear the skies for future bombing runs against Iran.

Meanwhile, Israeli officials were pursuing another track in their preparations — to sway Washington. Israeli officials have long believed that military action with U.S. participation to target the Iranian nuclear program would be more effective than Israel going alone. On Saturday, Trump indeed joined the conflict, ordering U.S. forces, including B-2 strategic bombers, to strike three Iranian nuclear sites.

Throughout the fall, the Israelis had met with their Biden administration counterparts to discuss intelligence collected by both countries in the summer that showed Iranian nuclear scientists were gathering to resume theoretical research on weaponization, according to three people with knowledge of the matter. But U.S. intelligence analysts did not conclude that the Iranian leadership had made such a decision — an assessment U.S. spy agencies revisited and maintained throughout the spring under the new Trump administration and up until the time Israel launched strikes, said five people familiar with the conclusions.

In private conversations, however, senior Israeli government officials said they had already decided by March, weeks before Netanyahu met Trump in the Oval Office on April 7, to strike Iran with or without U.S. participation by June at the latest, said two people with knowledge of the matter. The reasoning was that Iran would have rebuilt its air defenses by the latter half of the year, one of the people said.

Ultimately, when Netanyahu finally launched his surprise attack on Iran in the early hours of June 13 while Trump’s negotiations were still underway, the decision was not so much driven by new intelligence indicating an Iranian sprint for a nuclear weapon or any imminent threat to Israel. Rather, Israel seized on what it saw as a unique opportunity to execute plans, carefully laid months and years in advance, to heavily damage a weakened Iran that had long waged a bloody proxy conflict with Israel and to set back Iranian nuclear and missile programs, Israeli and U.S. officials and advisers to both governments say.

Whether or not Netanyahu had enough evidence of Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon to justify an attack has been the subject of intense debate globally and raises questions about the strikes’ permissibility under international law. In recent days, the issue has appeared to generate friction inside the U.S. administration, with Trump repeatedly dismissing the assessment delivered in March by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard that Iran’s leadership has not ordered the development of a nuclear weapon and telling reporters that he personally believed that Iran was “very close” to a bomb.

Netanyahu, who has argued for decades that Iran was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons and should be halted by military strikes, has acknowledged in recent interviews that Iran was still months or a year away from a weapon. What was undisputed, he has said, was that Iran had enriched large amounts of uranium to a level well beyond what is required for civilian use and built up a dangerous arsenal of ballistic missiles.

Israel’s calculus for attacking Iran was driven by a sense of both opportunity and necessity, said an Israeli official who, like many others quoted in this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

“It is true there was no better time: Israelis have never been more well-practiced, and Iran and their proxies have never been weaker,” said the Israeli official. “But that’s not enough for us to operate. The reason we operated is necessity and understanding there is no alternative. What if they break out [toward a nuclear weapon] and there is no way for us to notice? There is no safety zone left.”

U.S. intelligence agencies beginning late last year picked up on Israeli preparations for an attack and warned Washington policymakers that Israel was likely to strike in the first six months of 2025.

But Netanyahu’s plan was unexpectedly delayed when he was summoned to Washington to meet Trump and told that the United States would enter direct negotiations with Iran to solve the problem diplomatically. The prime minister’s strong inclination to strike, however, remained unchanged, said a person with knowledge of the thinking of top Israeli officials.

Going into the spring, there was also concern among Israeli officials that any potential deal between Trump envoy Steve Witkoff and Iran would still allow Iran to eventually possess a bomb, an Israeli official added. And, a former senior Israeli official said, the Israelis had been anticipating the scheduled retirement of Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, the U.S. Central Command chief who had helped make war plans with Israel throughout the spring.

In an interview Tuesday with pro-government Channel 14 television, Netanyahu said that he had decided on the exact timing of the strike only two weeks earlier, but that he had made the “difficult” decision to carry out the operation “several months ago” and began fleshing out the plan and its element of surprise in April.

The key was to eliminate the nuclear experts, Netanyahu said: “Those were my instructions: We’re going after the scientists, take them out.”

In Israel, the majority of the security establishment and political parties have supported Netanyahu’s decision to execute what they consider a preventative strike. For decades, a bedrock of Israeli strategic thinking has been the “Begin Doctrine,” named after former prime minister Menachem Begin, who defended Israel’s 1981 bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq as “anticipatory self-defense” against a potential enemy making a weapon of mass destruction.

But a minority of those have questioned the wisdom of carrying out a surprise attack while Trump was still pursuing the diplomatic route — and, they say, without proof that the Iranians had decided to construct a nuclear weapon.

“We should have given the political route a chance,” said Danny Citrinowicz, a former head of the Iran desk in the research department of Israeli military intelligence. “Now, we got operational achievements but the risks are enormous. We’ve never fought with a country like Iran. We find ourselves not knowing where the [highly enriched uranium] or centrifuges are. If we had an agreement, we would at least have less unknowns.”

Since Trump pulled out of the Obama-era nuclear deal with Iran in 2018, Iran has sharply increased its stockpile of near-weapons-grade enriched uranium, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. But intelligence agencies have debated whether Iran has resumed its effort to build a weapon — known as Project Amad — that was halted by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in 2003.

Last year, U.S. intelligence officials, including CIA Director William J. Burns, reviewed new intelligence and concluded that Iranian scientists were revisiting previously suspended nuclear weapons research, exploring paths that could allow them to more quickly make the leap to a crude nuclear bomb — if Khamenei so chose, three people familiar with the matter said. Israeli officials then came to the same realization.

But U.S. intelligence officials did not conclude that Khamenei had changed his stance and sanctioned a bomb, said former U.S. and Israeli officials with knowledge of the matter. “We knew they could speed up their timeline if they decided to change course,” a former senior U.S. official said.

The Israelis were more alarmed. The “main difference” between U.S. and Israeli views “was tactical and not substantial,” said a senior Israeli official. “We did see that Iran was advancing with a project,” the Israeli official added. “It wasn’t like [Iran] had a timeline, but the route that they had chosen was very concerning and dangerous. And some of the experts here had huge concerns.”

Jacob Nagel, a longtime adviser to Netanyahu on Iranian nuclear issues and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said Iranian scientists were working in academic settings, and there was never a “smoking gun” showing they had broken new ground on aspects of weaponization that were prohibited under the 2015 nuclear agreement, such as a multi-point detonation device used to trigger a nuclear explosion. But they were conducting research seemingly surreptitiously on topics that were difficult to justify as having only civilian applications, Nagel said. He added that Khamenei “probably knew what they were doing.”

At one point, the Biden administration asked Iran about the scientists’ activities, but the scientists carried on, which further fueled Israeli suspicions going into the spring, Nagel and another Israeli official said.

As Israeli officials geared up in recent months to strike while hoping the U.S. would join, Israel made another push with the Trump administration as part of regular intelligence sharing. U.S. intelligence officials did not see anything startlingly new, according to two people with knowledge of the matter.

But Israeli officials believed intelligence showed the scientists were revisiting studies in several alarming areas, including the multi-point detonation device, the production of plastic explosives and experiments on neutron radiation, according to one person who was briefed by Israeli officials in recent weeks.

Israeli officials acknowledged that they still assessed Khamenei had not ordered the production of a nuclear weapon, the person said, adding: “I don’t believe the Israeli [intelligence community] shaded their intel for political purposes, but I do believe in Netanyahu taking the inch and running a mile with it.”

In Washington, Trump came to believe that Iran was striving for a bomb, going beyond what analysts in his own intelligence agencies concluded. His CIA chief, John Ratcliffe, argued that the assessment dating back to 2007 that Khamenei had not ordered construction of a nuclear weapon was of limited value, said two people familiar with Ratcliffe’s views. Iran, he said, was like a football team that had gone 99 yards down the field, and there was no way it would not try for a nuclear touchdown.

Ariel Levite, a former senior Israeli national security official overseeing arms control, said it was reasonable to reach different analytical conclusions while working from the same set of collected intelligence.

“This is really hairsplitting,” said Levite, who is now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “You haven’t seen them packaging the warhead, but you’ve seen them working on shortening the period it would take to put it together and drive their threshold status to the extreme proximity to nuclear weapons. Does that reflect that a decision was already made by the supreme leader of, ‘Let’s go there’? Or was it merely [raising] preparedness to do so? It leaves things in the realm of interpretation.”

Richard Nephew, a lead U.S. negotiator with Iran under the Obama administration, said the real division appears not to have been between U.S. and Israeli intelligence analysts but between the spies and the politicians, who interpreted the intelligence in a more alarming fashion.

“It may be that the U.S. and Israeli intelligence services were on the same page, but they weren’t on the same page as their political leadership,” said Nephew, now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Nephew said it was not surprising that Iran would edge back toward the option of a bomb after suffering a series of strategic setbacks. By last fall, Israel had dealt staggering blows to allied Iranian groups such as Hamas and Lebanon-based Hezbollah, and had destroyed much of Iran’s air defenses in airstrikes in October, leaving it largely exposed.

In recent months, Israeli intelligence officers were tracking the locations of various members of the scientist group, and Israeli air force pilots were training to simultaneously strike the Iranian scientists and military officers in their homes, an Israeli official said. By this month, Israeli pilots had honed their capability to use new software and munitions to carry out dozens of strikes simultaneously — a capability they did not possess even a few years ago, said Matan Kahana, an Israeli lawmaker who was an air squadron commander.

An Israeli official said that Israel’s external intelligence service, the Mossad, had spent years collecting intelligence about each of the scientists who would be targeted for assassination and their roles in Iran’s nuclear program. Much of the agency’s knowledge about the Iranian program came from agents who were recruited and handled by the Mossad and worked inside the Natanz and Fordow facilities.

The Mossad also unfurled an elaborate, covert mission that included smuggling and installing kamikaze drones and missile launchers inside Iran itself, an Israeli official said. There was a risk that the covert operation could have been discovered, and that consideration partly influenced the timing of the June 13 attack but not Netanyahu’s strategic decision, made months earlier, to set it in motion, Israeli government officials and advisers said.

Today, the question of what intelligence Israel possessed about the activities of the Iranian scientists is “not relevant anymore” after Netanyahu decided to carry out their assassination and to cripple Iran’s missile program and military leadership, Nagel argued.

Since June 13, Israel has killed 10 key scientists and the U.S. and Israeli strikes have set back Iran’s quest for a bomb, Israeli officials say.

“All the scientists who were sneaking around,” Nagel said, “most of them are now sneaking around in hell.”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/23/netanyahu-iran-attack-nuclear-intelligence/

So you think everything is settled based on a temporary cease fire? You must have no idea how things in the middle east work. Trump broke an agreement that held Irans's nuclear program in check. But as they say, there's one born every minute. giggle, giggle.

That agreement did not hold everything in check. That agreement gave Iran the money to acquire the materials needed to become nuclear. Throwing money at a problem does not fix a problem.

It appears you are regurgitating what you have been told and not what was in the deal.

That money was Iran's all along and the very reason it was being withheld was because of their nuclear program. That was the entire reason we used to withhold it. Agreeing to that deal removed those sanctions.

The Iran nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), limited Iran's uranium enrichment to 3.67% for 15 years and restricted the number and types of centrifuges it could operate. Specifically, Iran was limited to 5,060 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz facility and 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow, with only a portion of the latter remaining operational for non-enrichment purposes. Additionally, the deal restricted uranium enrichment at the Fordow facility for 15 years. It also allowed for random inspections an any site requested at any time.

I mean it's nice to throw out some old cliche' that in no way pertains to this situation but unless you can come up with some factual evidence to back it up, which doesn't exist, then maybe you should stop making false claims.

And before you continue with this "we gave them the money" nonsense please keep in mind that are a member of OPEC+. They have a very steady stream of revenue from their oil industry.

https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo...s-in-much-anticipated-speech-to-congress

From 2015. Israel did not like the deal then.

https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-re...nvinced-trump-to-quit-iran-nuclear-deal/

Worked with Trump to end that deal.

I will take the word of a trusted Allies over the media.

So the same guy, Netanyahu, who has claimed Iran has been on the verge of having nuclear weapons since the early 90's is who you trust instead of the written deal itself? The deal was in writing. The terms are exactly what is stated in that agreement. You, as I expected, have shown nothing to dispute that. So he talked trump into ending a deal that would have prevented enriching uranium, limiting how much of that they could have and allowed inspections. Then he talked trump into bombing Iran. Hmmmmmm.....

Sadly I actually think you believe some of that BS.

Of course believe Propaganda from a POTUS who is a pathological liar. And from Netanyahu who faces prosecution as soon as he's out of office .... after lying about the Iranian capacity since 1992.

Instead of facts provided by international communities with access to Iran and Irans nuclear facilities.

Why? Because you choose to. Sadly your choice is wrong and willfully ignorant.

Fears over Iran’s missing 400kg of uranium
Satellite images show line of trucks at Fordow before strikes, with analysts suggesting materials were frantically moved

Connor Stringer
Deputy US Editor.
Iona Cleave
Related Topics
Iran, Middle East, Donald Trump, Nuclear weapons
23 June 2025 12:41pm BST

265

Trucks were seen swarming the Fordow facility on June 19 Credit: Maxar Technologies
Iran claims to have smuggled almost all of the country’s highly enriched uranium to a secret location before the US launched strikes on its nuclear bases.

Three of Tehran’s most critical enrichment facilities, including its underground facility at Fordow, were pummelled by B-2 stealth bombers and a barrage of submarine-launched missiles early on Sunday morning.

But officials believe that most of the material at Fordow and Iran’s other facilities had been moved elsewhere before the strikes.

Iran has vowed to continue enriching uranium in defiance of Donald Trump, raising further concerns over its nuclear programme.

Takht Ravanchi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, rejected claims that Tehran would abandon its nuclear programme, telling the Germany broadcaster ARD: “No one can tell us what we should and should not do.”



Following the mission, codenamed Midnight Hammer, the US president claimed to have “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear aspirations in the wave of strikes. He said the US had taken the bomb “right out of Iran’s hands” by inflicting “monumental damage” on the Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan facilities.


However, doubt has been cast on Mr Trump’s claims after senior US officials admitted they did not know the fate of Iran’s near-bomb-grade uranium stockpile.

Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said on Monday that extensive damage was expected to have occurred at the Fordow, but added that his agency was seeking access to “account for” Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpiles.

Two Israeli officials with knowledge of the intelligence told The New York Times that Iran had transferred equipment and uranium outside Fordow in recent days.

There was also evidence to suggest Iran had moved its 400kg stockpile of 60 per cent enriched uranium, which had been stored inside Isfahan, to a secret location.


JD Vance, the US vice president, hinted that the material had been moved at the 11th hour on Sunday. “We’re going to work in the coming weeks to ensure that we do something with that fuel,” he told ABC News.


Mr Grossi said the fuel had last been seen by UN inspectors a week before Israel began its attacks on Iran on June 13.

According to satellite imagery, trucks, bulldozers and security convoys appeared to swarm the Fordow facility two days before the US strikes. Analysts at TS2 Space, a Polish defence firm, suggested it revealed a “frantic effort” to move centrifuges or shielding materials.

Initial assessments suggest the fortified site at Fordow had sustained serious damage from the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (Mop) bombs, but had not been completely destroyed. Satellite images suggested that the bombs had a severe impact.

The already-damaged facility at Isfahan was hit by dozens of missiles, but it contained little or no enriched uranium when it was hit, the IAEA said.

Other images showed that Natanz, Iran’s largest enrichment site, had already been damaged by extensive Israeli strikes, which disrupted the electrical system. Mr Grossi later said he believed the loss of power at Natanz could have sent the centrifuges spinning out of control, likely to have destroyed all of them.


Moving its stockpile to a secret location means Iran could still possess the material needed to develop a nuclear weapon, depending on Tehran’s ability to rebuild vital equipment, including centrifuges, which could take years.


Ronen Solomon, an Israeli intelligence analyst, told The Telegraph that even if Iran had moved its uranium, it would be “like having fuel without a car”, adding: “They have the uranium, but they can’t do a lot with it, unless they have built something we don’t know about on a small scale.”

Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to the supreme leader, said: “Even assuming the complete destruction of the sites, the game is not over, because enriched materials, indigenous knowledge, and political will remain intact.”

Uranium enrichment is the process of increasing the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope in natural uranium. To build a nuclear weapon, uranium must be enriched to about 90 per cent U-235.

Iran enriches uranium using centrifuges, which spin uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to separate the uranium isotopes, increasing the concentration of U-235.


It has been progressively installing more advanced centrifuges, like the IR-2m and IR-6 models, which are faster and more efficient than the older IR-1 centrifuges, speeding up the time needed to make a nuclear bomb.


Iran’s centrifuge capacity before the Israeli and US strikes could have allowed it to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in less than two weeks, according to the Arms Control Association.

It is transported inside steel cylinders, specially designed to withstand significant pressure and temperature changes, according to the World Nuclear Association. The cylinders are then placed inside an extra level of protective casing, called an overpack, and can be transported via rail, road and sea.

Iran produces most of its near weapons-grade material at Fordow. As of May 17, Iran had amassed 408.6kg (901lb) of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent, a report by the IAEA found. It was an increase of 133.8kg from the IAEA’s last report in February.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/06/23/iranians-moved-enriched-uranium-before-us-strikes/

"Iran’s centrifuge capacity before the Israeli and US strikes could have allowed it to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in less than two weeks, according to the Arms Control Association."

Lmao..... Not aimed at you Northlima, but that quote there is horse patootee. That is NOT what any other country or organisation is saying.The Telegraph is a right wing broadsheet that spews right wing rhetoric non stop.

Trump blurts out expletive as he lashes out at Israel and Iran over ceasefire

Trump told ABC News "they don't know what the f--- they're doing."

President Donald Trump on Tuesday morning had strong words for Israel and Iran as he accused both nations of violating a ceasefire agreement he announced just the night prior.

"We basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard, that they don't know what the f--- they're doing. Do you understand that?" Trump told ABC News Senior Political Correspondent Rachel Scott when asked if both nations were committed to peace.

Trump was clearly frustrated as he spoke with reporters before departing the White House for a NATO summit at The Hague in the Netherlands.

"Israel says Iran violated the peace agreement and the ceasefire agreement. Do you believe that Iran is still committed to peace?" Scott asked the president.

"I do, yeah. They violated it but Israel violated it, too," Trump responded.

Scott then asked Trump if he was questioning Israel's commitment to peace.

"Israel as soon as we made the deal, they came out and dropped a boat load of bombs the likes of which I've never seen before," Trump said. "The biggest load that we've seen, I'm not happy with Israel. Ok, when I say now you have 12 hours, you don't go out in the first hour and just drop everything you have on them. So I'm not happy with him. I'm not happy with Iran either."

Neither Iran nor Israel have publicly commented on Trump's remarks about the apparent ceasefire violations.

Trump spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday morning, sources familiar with the call told ABC News.

A White House source provided a brief readout of the call: "President Trump was exceptionally firm and direct with Prime Minister Netanyahu about what needed to happen to sustain the ceasefire. The Prime Minister understood the severity of the situation and the concerns President Trump expressed."

Trump said on social media Monday evening that Israel and Iran had agreed to a ceasefire, signaling a possible end to nearly two weeks of escalating air assaults by the two countries.

The agreement described by Trump involved two 12-hour ceasefire periods, starting at about 12 a.m. EDT starting with Iran. That would come "when Israel and Iran have wound down and completed their in progress, final missions," Trump said in the post.

Israel would then follow with a second 12-hour ceasefire, Trump said.

After 24 hours, the war would be officially declared ended, according to Trump.

Does he even know what 2, 12 hour cease fires means? It doesn't mean a war ends. But as per usual we see another tantrum thrown by trump. Very stable genius?

MGH,
This is from a site called Iran Watch-it does say that the enrichment at 60% is about 90% of the way to weapons grade and "could" be done in a couple weeks-with a lot if what-ifs.

They also say that there are other parts of a sucessful weapon-and that they don't think that part has been figured out successfully yet.

It also seems to have a couple errors below. It says that Iran has thousands of kg of enriched uranium in stockpile and hasn't let the IAEA in since Feburary. The head of the IAEA said that Iran has 400kg of enriched up to 60% uranium and they saw it last on June 10th.



Iran's Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential
March 28, 2025
Publication Type:
Articles and Reports
Weapon Program:
Nuclear
Author:
Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin
This timetable estimates how soon Iran could enrich enough uranium to fuel a small nuclear arsenal. It assumes Iran would try to build an arsenal of at least five warheads of the implosion type – the goal Iran set for itself when it began to work on nuclear weapons decades ago. With its thousands of gas centrifuges in operation and thousands of kilograms of enriched uranium in its stockpile, Iran can now quickly enrich uranium to a grade suitable for nuclear weapons.

The analysis below reflects the status of Iran’s enrichment program as of February 8, 2025, the date of the latest estimates provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Because Iran has reduced its cooperation with the Agency, the IAEA is no longer able to precisely verify Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium at any one time. The Agency can verify uranium product that has been removed from the enrichment process, but it must rely on information provided by Iran to account for the amount that remains in-process. Because the in-process uranium represents a fraction of the total stockpile that is later verified, however, the estimates are suitable for use as a baseline measurement of how much enriched uranium Iran possesses. The analysis below is based on those estimates.

Summary


Iran’s nuclear program has reached the point at which Iran might be able to enrich enough uranium for five fission weapons within about one week and enough for eight weapons in less than two weeks. For that uranium to pose a nuclear weapon threat, however, it would have to be processed further into weapon components. Also, the other parts of a successful weapon would have to be ready to receive the uranium. Fabricating these other components could be done in parallel with uranium enrichment and could take place on a laboratory scale, which would make them difficult to detect.

Iran's ability to enrich uranium quickly has improved with its progress in the testing and deployment of successively more powerful centrifuge models. Centrifuge performance is measured in separative work units (SWU), which indicates the work required to increase the concentration of the fissionable U-235 isotope. Iran has installed its second- and third-generation centrifuge models in production lines where they have steadily increased the size of Iran's uranium stockpile.

The enrichment level of Iran’s existing stockpile also contributes to Iran’s ability to quickly produce fuel for a small nuclear arsenal. Since April 2021, Iran has stockpiled uranium enriched to 60% of the fissionable U-235 isotope. Enrichment to that level already accomplishes over 90% of the work needed to bring natural uranium to weapon-grade.

This progress increases the risk of secret sites – permitting them to be smaller and easier to hide. Iran has used such sites to carry out illicit activity in the past and they continue to pose a nuclear weapon risk. That risk has increased further because of Iran’s decisions to limit inspections by the IAEA. Since February 2021, Iran has denied IAEA access to recorded data from centrifuge production plants and in June 2022 forced the IAEA to remove monitoring equipment altogether from such plants as well as from uranium enrichment and uranium concentrate (yellowcake) production facilities. Although a few cameras were re-installed at centrifuge production plants in May 2023, the Agency still cannot access the recordings. Iran has also refused to cooperate with the Agency’s investigation of uranium particles found at two undeclared sites. The overall effect has caused the IAEA to lose knowledge of essential elements of Iran’s program.

Nuclear Weapon Potential of Iran's Centrifuges and Enriched Uranium


As of February 2025, Iran was operating 36 cascades of IR-1 centrifuges as well as 42 cascades of more powerful centrifuges (27 IR-2m cascades, 12 IR-4 cascades, and three IR-6 cascades) at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). In addition, Iran was operating six cascades of IR-1 centrifuges and seven cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) and more than a thousand centrifuges at the Natanz pilot plant, notably the IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6. As Iran deploys an increasing number of its more powerful IR-2m, IR-4, and IR6 centrifuge models, it will be able to produce nuclear weapon fuel more quickly.

Iran's centrifuges have not produced uranium usually defined as weapon-grade, which is uranium enriched to 90% or higher in the isotope U-235.[1] All of Iran’s production has been at lower grades. Thus, the lower-grade uranium would have to be enriched further to reach at least 90%. The estimate below assumes that, in a dash to make weapons, Iran would rely on its centrifuges operating in production mode at Natanz or Fordow and would use its accumulated stockpile of enriched uranium[2] to produce nuclear weapon fuel. Iran's enriched uranium stockpile already contains sufficient uranium enriched to 60% U-235 to fuel up to eight nuclear warheads with further enrichment.[3] The estimate also assumes that the IR-1 centrifuges currently operating will perform at the same rate they have in the past and that the IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges would perform at a rate below their estimated nominal output.[4]

Estimated time it would take the centrifuges presently installed in production mode to enrich enough uranium for a small arsenal[5]

# of Weapons 60% Uranium Enrichment Work Time
5-8 168-269 kg 480-768 SWU Up to 2 weeks
This estimate is based upon the minimum theoretical time it would take Iran’s known operating centrifuges, running continuously at their proved or estimated capacity, to accomplish the required amount of work. The actual time needed would likely be greater. Iran could, for example, decide to use only some of its centrifuges in production mode to achieve 90% enrichment, and could do so either at its Natanz enrichment site, its Fordow enrichment site, or both. Technical issues or poor performance by some centrifuges could also slow the process.

It is important to consider that the enriched uranium produced would be in a gaseous compound, uranium hexafluoride (UF6). It would take additional time to convert the uranium in the gas to metallic form, and then to cast and machine the metal into weapon components. According to the IAEA, Iran began work on uranium metal production in early 2021. The uranium metal, however, would only be a threat if Iran had already perfected all the other parts needed for a working weapon, such as the high explosives and firing circuit, and had made sure the parts would work together to achieve a nuclear explosion. There is ample evidence in the public domain that Iran has tried to achieve that goal (see Weaponization below), but no conclusive evidence that it has succeeded.

It is also important to consider that Iran could use its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium to make weapons directly without the need for further enrichment. There would be limitations in the delivery of such weapons, as discussed below.

The Risk of Secret Sites


If Iran makes nuclear weapons, it could do so at secret sites. The reasons are clear. If, in a dash to make weapons, Iran were to divert known (and therefore inspected) sites, material, or equipment to weapon making, it would risk detection before success, would violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and would make itself an international pariah. It would also invite an attack on the very sites, material, and equipment it diverted. No country has ever chosen to make an illicit diversion and dash to weapons, probably for the reasons just stated.

The data below reveal that as Iran develops more powerful centrifuges, it could use ever smaller sites to enrich weapon quantities of uranium. And the smaller the site, the more difficult it will be to detect. For example, operating at 80% of its nominal capacity of 5 SWU, Iran’s IR-2m centrifuge, of which Iran has over 7,000 installed, could enrich the same amount of uranium as the IR-1 centrifuge in approximately one-fifth the space. Iran’s enrichment plant at Fordow, which was publicly exposed in 2009, was built clandestinely by Iran to house about 3,000 centrifuges. For this reason, the estimates below use 3,000 centrifuges as the possible size of a secret enrichment plant.

Estimated minimum time it would take 3,000 of Iran’s IR-2m[6] centrifuges starting with natural uranium to enrich enough uranium for
One weapon Four months[7]
Five weapons One year and eight months[8]
These centrifuges would require only about 32,000 square feet, equal to approximately twice the size of the ice surface of a professional hockey rink.[9] Alternatively, Iran could decide to split these 3,000 IR-2m centrifuges equally among three smaller sites of approximately 11,000 square feet each. That would decrease the size of each site and therefore the likelihood of detection. Each site would be about two-thirds the size of the ice surface of a professional hockey rink.[10]

If Iran instead filled the facility or facilities with 3,000 IR-6 centrifuges rather than IR-2m centrifuges, it could make a secret dash more quickly. According to Iran, the IR-6 produces about 10 SWU per year, about twice as much as the IR-2m and ten times as much as the IR-1. At Fordow in 2022, Iran used two cascades of IR-6 machines enriching natural uranium to produce the 5% feed for the IR-1 centrifuges enriching up to 20% U-235.[11] To produce enough feed for this configuration, each IR-6 machine would have to produce at least 6.6 SWU.[12]

Estimated minimum time it would take 3,000 of Iran’s IR-6[13] centrifuges starting with natural uranium to enrich enough uranium for
One weapon Two and a half months[14]
Five weapons Twelve months[15]
Again, these IR-6 centrifuges would require approximately the same space as the model IR-2m centrifuges above, or approximately twice the size of the ice surface of a professional hockey rink. The space requirements above reveal that as Iran develops more efficient centrifuges, it could rely on ever smaller sites to enrich weapon quantities of uranium.

Moreover, the above estimates presume that Iran would begin with natural uranium when enriching at secret sites. If it were able instead to divert some of its 20% or 60% enriched uranium stockpile to secret sites equipped with IR-2m, IR-4, or IR-6 centrifuges, it could enrich a sufficient amount to weapons grade in a matter of days or weeks, instead of months. Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile remains under IAEA monitoring and verification, but the Agency no longer enjoys daily access to the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities.

The Status of Weaponization Efforts


The analysis above assumes that Iran would use 16 kg of highly enriched uranium metal (about 90% U-235) in the finished core of each nuclear weapon. Sixteen kilograms are assumed to be sufficient for an implosion weapon. This was the amount called for in a design for such a device that has circulated on the nuclear black market, to which Iran has had access.

Some experts believe that Iran could use less material, assuming Iran would accept a lower yield for each weapon. According to these experts, Iran could use as few as seven kilograms of this material if Iran’s weapon developers possessed a “medium” level of skill, and if Iran were satisfied with an explosive yield slightly less than that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan.[16] If Iran chose to use an amount smaller than 16 kg, the time required to make the fuel for each weapon would be less than estimated here. Or, in the amount of time estimated here, Iran could make a greater number of weapons. Iran could decide not to use such a smaller amount of uranium if Iran wanted to have more confidence that its weapons would work, or if it wanted to reduce the size of its weapons by reducing the amount of high explosive.

Conversely, Iran could use more material at a lower level of enrichment (60%) and rely on a “gun type” nuclear weapon such as the one dropped on Hiroshima. Iran has enough material for one or more such devices, which would not require testing, but which would be heavier and larger than an implosion device. Iran seems unlikely to pursue this option in light of the short time now necessary to produce 90% enriched material.

According to an investigation by the IAEA into "possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear program, Iran had a coordinated nuclear weapon program between 1999 and 2003. Specifically, the IAEA found that Iran developed several components of a nuclear weapon and undertook related research and testing. The investigation revealed Iran's efforts in the following areas:

computer modeling of implosion, compression, and nuclear yield;
high explosive tests simulating a nuclear explosion using non-nuclear material in order to see whether an implosion device would work;
the construction of at least one containment vessel at a military site, in which to conduct such high explosive tests;
studies on detonation of high explosive charges, in order to ensure uniform compression in an implosion device, including at least one large scale experiment in 2003, and experimental research after 2003;
support from a foreign expert in developing a detonation system suitable for nuclear weapons and a diagnostic system needed to monitor the detonation experiments;
manufacture of a neutron initiator, which is placed in the core of an implosion device and, when compressed, generates neutrons to start a nuclear chain reaction, along with validation studies on the initiator design from 2006 onward;
the development of exploding bridgewire detonators (EBWs) used in simultaneous detonation, which are needed to initiate an implosive shock wave in fission weapons;
the development of high voltage firing equipment that would enable detonation in the air, above a target, in a fashion only making sense for a nuclear payload;
testing of high voltage firing equipment to ensure that it could fire EBWs over the long distance needed for nuclear weapon testing, when a device might be located down a deep shaft; and
a program to integrate a new spherical payload onto Iran’s Shahab-3 missile, enabling the missile to accommodate the detonation package described above.
Information obtained by Israeli intelligence and revealed in April 2018 indicates that Iran sought to preserve this program after 2003 by dividing its nuclear program between covert and overt activities and retaining an expert team to continue work on weaponization. This "atomic archive" includes blueprints, spreadsheets, charts, photos, and videos – apparently official Iranian documents – that provide additional detail about Iran's efforts to develop a working nuclear weapon that could be delivered on a ballistic missile. In mid-2024, the U.S. intelligence community dropped its longstanding assertion that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”

Iran's Violations of the 2015 Nuclear Accord


Following the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear accord in May 2018, Iranian leaders threatened to stop implementing some of Iran’s commitments under the accord. On January 5, 2020, Iran announced that it would no longer observe any limit (such as that set by the nuclear accord of 2015) on the use of its centrifuges, or on the possession of uranium they enrich. Since then, Iran has expanded its stockpile of enriched uranium, increased the enrichment level of that stockpile, brought more advanced centrifuges into operation, experimented with uranium metal, and severely limited the IAEA’s ability to monitor its nuclear activities. The table below summarizes the steps Iran has taken since July 2019.

Date Iran's Violations of the 2015 Accord
July 2019 Begins enriching uranium above the 3.67% U-235 limit set by the accord, to a level of up to 4.5% U-235.
August 2019 Exceeds the cap of 300 kg of UF6 on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium set by the accord.
September 2019 Expands its centrifuge research and development beyond the limits set by the accord, both in the number and type of more powerful centrifuge it operates.
November 2019 Resumes uranium enrichment at locations beyond those mandated by the accord, including the Fordow plant and the Natanz pilot plant.
January 2020 States it will no longer limit the number of centrifuges in operation, which had been capped at 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges operating at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant.
July 2020 Announces plans to transfer more powerful IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 centrifuges from the Natanz pilot plant to the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. The accord limits Iran to the use of IR-1 centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant.
October 2020 Installs IR-2m centrifuges and begins installing IR-4 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant.
November 2020 Begins uranium enrichment in a cascade of 174 IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant.
January 2021 Begins enriching uranium to the level of 20% U-235 at the Fordow plant and begins uranium enrichment in a second cascade of 174 IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant.
February 2021 Begins installing IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordow plant and uses a facility in Isfahan to produce uranium metal, which the accord prohibits for 15 years.
February 2021 Stops implementing transparency measures, including the Additional Protocol to Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and additional transparency and access measures allowed under the accord. Withholds access to data recorded by IAEA monitoring devices.
April 2021
Begins enriching uranium up to 60% U-235.

May 2021 Installs equipment to produce uranium metal in quantity.
June 2022 Removes IAEA monitoring devices installed pursuant to the 2015 accord. In a partial reversal in May 2023, some devices are reinstalled and the IAEA installs new monitoring devices at Fordow and the Natanz pilot plant.


Footnotes:
[1] The IAEA detected the presence of uranium particles enriched up to 84% at FFEP in samples taken during a visit on January 22, 2023, but later verified that Iran had not accumulated uranium enriched to levels above 60%. See "Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)," (GOV/2023/8) International Atomic Energy Agency, February 28, 2023, paras. 34 and 36, available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/23/03/gov2023-8.pdf.

[2] The IAEA estimated that as of February 8, 2025, Iran's uranium stockpile contained 7,464.0 kg of uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), 274.8 kg of which was enriched "up to" a level of 60% in the fissionable isotope U-235, 606.8 kg of which was enriched "up to" a level of 20% U-235, and 3,655.4 kg of which was enriched "up to" a level of 5% U-235. The U-235 isotope makes up about .7% of natural uranium; its concentration can be increased, or enriched, using centrifuges.

[3] Twenty kilograms of uranium in the form of UF6 enriched to 90% U-235 are assumed to be sufficient for one weapon. The uranium would need to be further processed into finished metal weapon components, which is assumed to cause about a 20% loss of material.

[4] According to pre-2016 production data from Natanz, Iran's IR-1 centrifuges have achieved an average annual output of about .8 separative work units, or SWUs, per machine. The IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges are based on Pakistan's P-2 centrifuge and is assumed in these estimates to have an operational output of 4 SWU (and a nominal output of 5 SWU). See Alexander Glaser, "Characteristics of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment and Their Relevance for Nuclear Weapon Proliferation (corrected)," Science and Global Security, Vol. 16, Nos. 1-2 (2008), p. 9. The IR-6 is assumed in these estimates to have an operational output of 6.6 SWU (see note 19). The SWU is the standard measure of the effort (work) required to increase the concentration of the fissionable U-235 isotope. See http://www.urenco.com/index.php/content/89/glossary.

[5] This table uses estimates of Iran’s stockpile as of February 8, 2025, to calculate the total effort needed to make the fuel for five or more weapons. These theoretical calculations are generated using a SWU calculator published by URENCO, a European uranium enrichment consortium. They assume that 20 kg of 90% U-235 in the form of UF6 would be needed for each weapon. The tails are assumed to be 1% and because the IAEA describes the enrichment level as "up to" a percentage, a lower feed enrichment percentage (54%) is used for these calculations.

With an output of 0.8 SWU annually, Iran’s 6,204 operational IR-1 centrifuges at FEP would generate about 4,963 SWU per year, Iran’s 4,698 IR-2m centrifuges would generate about 18,792 SWU per year assuming an operational capacity of 4 SWU per machine, its 2,088 IR-4 centrifuges at FEP would generate 8,352 SWU per year assuming an operational capacity of 4 SWU per machine, and Iran’s 522 IR-6 centrifuges would generate 3,445 SWU per year assuming an operational capacity of 6.6 SWU per machine. In total, the cascades operating in production mode at FEP could generate up to about 35,552 SWU annually, or about 97.4 SWU per day.

Based on the output estimates above, Iran’s 1,044 operational IR-1 centrifuges at FFEP would generate about 835 SWU per year and Iran’s 1,220 IR-6 centrifuges would generate about 8,052 SWU per year. In total the cascades operating in production mode at FFEP could generate up to about 8,887 SWU annually, or about 25 SWU per day.

It is assumed that 96 SWU and 33.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% would be needed to produce 20 kg of uranium enriched to 90% (enough for a single weapon). Thus, the combined capacity of the enrichment sites at Natanz and Fordow, which is about 120 SWU per day, would be theoretically sufficient to produce enough 90% material for five weapons in a week or less and enough for eight weapons in two weeks or less. These estimates would still be accurate even if Iran chose to forego the IR-1 and use only its more advanced centrifuges to increase enrichment to 90%.

[6] The IR-2m is based on Pakistan's P-2 centrifuge and is assumed in these estimates to have an operational output of 4 SWU (and a nominal output of 5 SWU). See Alexander Glaser, "Characteristics of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment and Their Relevance for Nuclear Weapon Proliferation (corrected)," Science and Global Security, Vol. 16, Nos. 1-2 (2008), p. 9.

[7] 3,000 IR-2m centrifuges, each with an operational output of 4 SWU, would produce approximately 12,000 SWU in one year. If about 4,000 SWU are needed to produce the 20 kg of 90% U-235 to fuel one weapon (assuming tails of .3% and a feed assay of .7% U-235) then it would take at least 4 months to produce the 4,000 SWU.

[8] The same 3,000 IR-2m centrifuges, producing an assumed 12,000 SWU per year, would produce the 20,000 SWU needed to fuel 5 weapons in approximately one year and eight months.

[9] Each centrifuge is assumed to require about one square meter (10.7 square feet) of space, the amount used in Iran’s enrichment plant at Natanz. The ice surface of a National Hockey League rink is 200 feet long and 85 feet wide.

[10] 1,000 centrifuges at 10.7 square feet each would require about 11,000 square feet.

[11] "Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) (GOV/2022/62)," International Atomic Energy Agency, November 10, 2022, paragraphs 27-29.

[12] The 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow generate about 835 SWU annually, if operated at their historic production rate of 0.8 SWU each. If this amount of work is used to enrich feed at about 4% enrichment to a level of about 20% enrichment, Iran would require 435 kg of about 4% feed to produce 82 kg of 20% product annually. To produce the 435 kg of about 4% feed from natural uranium, as Iran expected the IR-6 centrifuges to do, would require 2,295 SWU. Dividing the 2,295 SWU by the estimated number of IR-6 machines in the two cascades yields about 6.6 SWU per machine for two cascades.

[13] Iran has claimed that the IR-6 centrifuge is ten times more powerful than the IR-1. The IR-6 is assumed in these estimates to have an operational output of 6.6 SWU (about 66% of the nominal output of 10 SWU). This is based on recent production at Fordow, where Iran temporarily used two cascades of IR-6 machines to produce the feed for the IR-1 centrifuges enriching up to 20% U-235. To produce enough feed for this configuration, each IR-6 machine would have to produce at least 6.6 SWU.

[14] 3,000 IR-6 centrifuges each producing 6.6 SWU per year would produce in one year 19,800 SWU, or 1,650 SWU per month. Thus, it would take about two and a half months to produce the 4,000 SWU needed to fuel one weapon.

[15] 3,000 IR-6 centrifuges each producing 6.6 SWU per year would produce the 20,000 SWU needed to fuel five weapons in at least twelve months.

[16] See Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “The Amount of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons,” (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, revised April 13, 1995).

Thanks Northlima. Good read. Ive read and heard that the iaea dont agree that iran was imminent with capacity to produce a nuclear weapon. I've also heard a lot of smart people talking about how much easier ot would be to produce a dirty bomb if they wanted to. I'm at least 24 hours behind on the news cycle.... but the bottom line for me is that Netanyahu isn't trustworthy, Trump less so. It was only a very short while ago US intelligence said that Iran was not close .... The sudden claims that Iran was an imminent threat is far too convenient for Netanyahu and frankly without providing cast iron proof ... Its all a load of BS.

Some who at one time promoted the US not getting sucked into policing the world suddenly wave pom poms and cheerlead for it because ... Well because Trump. It would be funny If ot wasnt so messed up.

Iran is enriching-the IAEA said that. They also said they have seen the operation.
But the IAEA said that they are not trying to make bombs and the inspectors have not seen themselves that they are. Could they be doing it elsewhere or hiding the other components-sure they could.


Yes, Bibi isn't trustworthy and trump is a pathological liar.

And now it seems that most of the enriched uranium has been removed from the facilities and nobody is sure where it is.
There are alot of shady characters in that region that would like to get their hands on some

It is a shame, but the Bible says in the last days he will make Jerusalem/Israel a burdensome stone. If your heart is not right, it will show with your beliefs for/against Israel his chosen people. Zacheriah 12:3 And in that day will I make Jerusalem a burdensome stone for all people: all that burden themselves with it shall be cut in pieces, though all the people of the earth be gathered together against it.

I've been reading all of your posts. You are one of the last people on earth that should preaching about what the Bible says. So somehow in your brain you think trump was sent to fulfill the prophecy?



I've been hearing how it's "the last days" since the early 80's and I'm sure many were saying it long before that. I'm going to go with...................

Matthew 24:36
King James

But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels of heaven, but my Father only.

It's worked out quite well for me so far.

As with many, you seem to be confusing supporting a politician with supporting the Israeli people and tjhe nation of Israel. A nation consists of its people and not who rules the nation in the moment. God has never said we should idolize or follow one man regardless of what he does. In fact quite the opposite.

Israel - mainly Netanyahu - has never been a fan of a negotiated agreement. We saw that again this round. When talks of negotiations were starting to resume, Israel struck. I think the question that ultimately needs to be answered is whether we are in a better situation now, or whether we'd be in a better situation if we had maintained the original JCPOA. If it gets back to a negotiated peace with no further aggression, we are aware of where Iran's uranium stockpiles are, and Iran doesn't go underground (a la North Korea), that could justify everything that just happened.

All that has to come together, though.

It is well with my soul. How about yours? I was referring to good people like MTG, Tucker Carlson, and Candace Owens. Your stance on Israel will revel your heart toward God.

God also knows who Netanyahu is. He knows that I refuse to support yet another corrupt leader who intentionally starves woman and children and intentionally kills civilians by bombing entire neighborhoods. Who has lied by claiming Iran was on the verge of having nuclear weapons since the 1990's just to start a war. He knows I did my homework before blindly supporting yet another demagogue.

He also knows I support the Jewish people and that supporting yet another corrupt politician isn't the same thing. So yeah, I'm pretty sure I'm good there.

You're still having trouble in telling the difference between supporting a corrupt man to supporting Israel. I wish I could help you with that. But alas that seems futile.

Does that mean when you didn't support Obama or Biden that you didn't support America? Serious question.

I did not support an America lead by evil people like Obama and Biden. They support the murder of the innocent unborn children, they support mutilating children with their trans policies, putting men in women's restrooms, I could go on and on and on, just like all of WOKE their agenda was against all things of God. I did not support them. So, what did I do. I voted. I prayed for the Country. What did I not do. I did not riot in the streets and make my country look like a 3rd world country. No, I do not support the January 6th rioters. I did not support the BLM rioters, and I do not support the anti ICE rioters. There is a right way and a wrong way to support what you believe in. I support Israel. I believe they have a right to defend themselves from what happened on Oct 7th. They were attacked and they should not be stopped until they have rid the world of their enemies. Support all of the actions they have taken to achieve their goal of living peacefully in their land.

🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣

OMG .... Just wow.

So you only support America depending on who the leader is at the time. Thanks for that. I always support America even if I don't support its leaders. Just like I do with Israel. But when I do it I'm wrong and when you do it you're right?


The same way that Netanyahu himself directly orders the murders all of those innocent children in Gaza? Or is it suddenly different after children are born?


You do realize that Jesus said that whoever accepts him shall be saved and not that we should impose his teachings on everyone, right? Giving people a choice whether to follow his teaching or not was one of the main principals of his message. Giving people choices is not promoting something. Inflicting your religious beliefs on the public was never a part of his message.


So the same thing I'm doing now.


So you somehow think I did riot in the streets? As long as we're clear that it's not a one way street. So both sides at times make America look like a third world country then? Because just like you seem to indicate those others do, Jan. 6th and Charlottesville looked no different. We just saw four people get shot and two of them killed over politics last week.


On this we agree 100%.


There is no excuse for the purposeful starvation and purposeful bombings of innocent women and children. It seems you seem so concerned about children right up until the moment they're born. Or maybe it's about where they are born, their religion or who controls their government that makes such a big difference in your eyes. I'm having trouble figuring that part out.The book I read says we are all god's children. That includes the innocent civilians of Gaza. Starving an entire nation by claiming that's a part of war is unforgivable. If after reading the Bible you support that we must be reading different books.

Strike Set Back Iran’s Nuclear Program by Only a Few Months, U.S. Report Says
Classified findings indicate that the attack sealed off the entrances to two facilities but did not collapse their underground buildings.


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Reporters photographing a display for “Midnight Hammer,” the name of the American operation to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites, during a news conference on Sunday.Credit...Alex Brandon/Associated Press
Julian E. BarnesHelene CooperEric SchmittRonen BergmanMaggie HabermanJonathan Swan
By Julian E. BarnesHelene CooperEric SchmittRonen BergmanMaggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan

Reporting from Washington

June 24, 2025, 3:20 p.m. ET
A preliminary classified U.S. report says the American bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites sealed off the entrances to two of the facilities but did not collapse their underground buildings, according to officials familiar with the findings.

The early findings conclude that the strikes over the weekend set back Iran’s nuclear program by only a few months, the officials said.

Before the attack, U.S. intelligence agencies had said that if Iran tried to rush to making a bomb, it would take about three months. After the U.S. bombing run and days of attacks by the Israeli Air Force, the report by the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that the program was delayed less than six months.

Former officials said that any rushed effort by Iran to get a bomb would be to develop a relatively small and crude device. A miniaturized warhead would be far more difficult to produce, and it is not clear how much damage to that more advanced research has taken place.

The findings suggest that President Trump’s statement that Iran’s nuclear facilities were obliterated was overstated, at least based on the initial damage assessment. Congress had been set to be briefed on the strike on Tuesday, and lawmakers were expected to ask about the findings of the assessment, but the session was postponed. Senators are now set be briefed on Thursday.

The report also said much of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium was moved before the strikes, which destroyed little of the nuclear material. Some of that may have been moved to secret nuclear sites maintained by Iran.

Some Israeli officials said they also believe that Iran has maintained small covert enrichment facilities that were built so the Iranian government could continue its nuclear program in the event of an attack on the larger facilities.

Sign up to get Maggie Haberman's articles emailed to you. Maggie Haberman is a White House correspondent reporting on President Trump. Get it sent to your inbox.
Officials cautioned that the five-page classified report is only an initial assessment, and others will follow as more information is collected and as Iran examines the three sites at Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan. One official said that the reports people in the administration had been shown were “mixed” but that more assessments were yet to be done.

But the Defense Intelligence Agency report indicates that the sites were not damaged as much as some administration officials had hoped, and that Iran retains control of almost all of its nuclear material, meaning if it decides to make a nuclear weapon it might still be able to do so relatively quickly.


Officials interviewed for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity because the findings of the report remain classified.

The White House took issue with the assessment. Karoline Leavitt, a White House spokeswoman, said it was “flat-out wrong.”

“The leaking of this alleged assessment is a clear attempt to demean President Trump, and discredit the brave fighter pilots who conducted a perfectly executed mission to obliterate Iran’s nuclear program,” she said in a statement. “Everyone knows what happens when you drop 14 30,000-pound bombs perfectly on their targets: total obliteration.”

Elements of the intelligence report were reported earlier by CNN.

The strikes badly damaged the electrical system at Fordo, which is housed deep inside a mountain to shield it from attacks, officials said. It is not clear how long it will take Iran to gain access to the underground buildings and then repair the electrical systems and reinstall equipment that was moved.

Image

A satellite image provided by Maxar Technologies of the Fordo nuclear site.Credit...Maxar Technologies, via Associated Press
Initial Israeli damage assessments have also raised questions of the effectiveness of the strikes. Israeli defense officials said they have also collected evidence that the underground facilities at Fordo were not destroyed.

Before the strike, the U.S. military gave officials a range of possibilities for how much the attack could set back the Iranian program. Those ranged from a few months on the low end to years on the higher end.

Some officials cautioned that such estimates are imprecise, and that it is impossible to know how long Iran would exactly take to rebuild, if it chose to do so.

Mr. Trump has declared that B-2 bombing raids and Navy Tomahawk missile strikes “obliterated” the three Iranian nuclear sites, an assertion that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth repeated at a Pentagon news conference on Sunday.

But Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been more careful in describing the attack’s effects.

“This operation was designed to severely degrade Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure,” General Caine said that at the Sunday news conference.

The final battle damage assessment for the military operation against Iran, General Caine said on Sunday, standing next to Mr. Hegseth, was still to come. He said the initial assessment showed that all three of the Iranian nuclear sites that were struck “sustained severe damage and destruction.”

At a Senate hearing on Monday, Democrats also struck a more cautionary note in challenging Mr. Trump’s assessment.

“We still await final battle damage assessments,” said Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, the senior Democrat on the Armed Services Committee.

Military officials had said that to do more significant damage to the underground sites, they would have to be hit with multiple strikes. But Mr. Trump announced he would stop the strikes after approving the first wave.

U.S. intelligence agencies had concluded before the strikes that Iran had not made the decision to make a nuclear weapon, but possessed enough enriched uranium that if it decided to make a bomb, it could do so relatively quickly.

While intelligence officials had predicted that a strike on Fordo or other nuclear facilities by the United States could prompt Iran to make a bomb, U.S. officials said they do not know yet if Iran would do so.

Representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency did not respond to requests for comment.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/24/...RU8.v7ca.Q9JinFHvnDyV&smid=url-share

Yeah Yeah Yeah…but we totally obliterated the entrance.

Guess the USA was sold a bill of goods and not the bunker buster we bought. Trump should be asking for our hard earned tax dollars to be refunded to the treasury.

This article by the NY Times is not credible at all, neither is the URL provided in the article that goes to CNN. Both publications don't have very good track records when it comes to reporting any type of news. They used to but that time has passed...

It references so called classified reports and documents, yet when I kept scrolling and scrolling and scrolling I didn't see any works cited or verifiable documents of proof attached. Also, you can't just say "sources" and expect me to believe you, cause I don't. And you also can't put someone's quote in there and then just take a leap on a slanted interpretation of what it might mean. It's a reach.

Until I see the documents, the whole article is nothing but hearsay. Nobody can convince me otherwise.

MAGA, like their leader, always celebrates before the deal is done. Always.

They love the big splash... All Flash no substance.

Irans stated objective from the get go has always been to eliminate Israel. Until that is addressed and resolved, there is nothing that will work long term NOTHING!

Funny thing, the leadership in Iran is hated by well in excess of Half the population. They are the ones that recognize that the only way for them to live is to get that regime out.

If they do that, there is a real chance that peace could be found. This weak ass stuff that trump is trying to pull off is good for Flash, but it won't last.

Asmongold 2028

Trump declares that Israel and Iran don't know what the F*** they're doing. I love it!

I think it was an observation by Baby Bush that described this weird (Vance-like!) behavior you describe in tRUMP, MAGA lackeys, and gushing adorers who breathlessly fawn all over him just like way too much of the media no matter how long and wrong the lie or or how crappy his judgment. How can Agent Orange in a dumb hat (weird!) be upset and cussing for the world because he trusted some folks who broke their word, their treaties he claimed as his doing, and obliterated his deal and gave him the same kind of loyalty, snubbing his ignorant judgment. Karma Chameleon. Oh, the quote thingy!

Baby B. once described some loudmouthed blowhard political opponent who believed that he knew it all:

"That man there, he is all hat and no cattle." This administration is constantly proving it is the Amateur Hour with "The Not-Ready-for-Prime-Time-Players. Truly weird directions from Miller have helped this process along IMO.

Two days before the USAF dropped bombs on Irans nuke sites, Iran was seen lining up trucks and moving equipment and material away from the USAF bombing targets.

Someone obviously tipped off the Iranians about coming strike. Someone within the Trump administration leaked
the time when the USAF strike was going to occur which allowed Iran to move the targeted material.

Did someone with knowledge of when the strike was going to occur leak this critical information to Iran.?

It sure appears that Trump has someone within his inner circle leaking intelligence to our enemy.

It's time for Trump and his inner circle to look into a mirror to figure out who might have compromised the bombing mission 2 days before the strike took place.

By the same criteria, neither is the admin itself.

It's a classified document and anyone speaking on it would be doing so anonymously. I'm not really sure what you're expecting here.

Our intelligence community states the damage wasn't nearly to the extent trump claimed. An unintelligent man and his paid cronies yells fake news and his minions still listen to that BS line.


And there it is. If our intelligence report shows something other than what trump says, he is a victim. If you report what it says you are demeaning him. If you report the weapons you provided those pilots use didn't not produce the damage he claimed they did you must be "discrediting" our service members. What a bunch of morons. Yet once again their minions still lap it up.

Here's a news flash. Those pilots did exactly what they were told to do and performed their duties well. The fact that trump came out right after the bombings, with no idea of any damage report and shot off his pie hole has nothing to do with that.

I'm not surprised that you love an American president having a tantrum by yelling the F bomb on national TV. I don't doubt you think that's the example the leader of the free world should set for our nations children to emulate. But then with all of the things he's done such as ripping off college students, sexual assault, ripping off his own charity and 34 felony convictions I suppose that ship sailed a long time ago

Questioning the credibility of NYT and then turning around and posting political commentary from a videogame influencer is peak MAGA.

Except that the White House itself has spoken of and referred to the leaked document and spoken of it to try and discredit it's conclusion - ergo lending a validity that it does exist and seemingly acknowledging what it is reported to have said.

But that isn't going to sit well with MAGA - much eaiser to post something by some rando SM 'influencer'.

In today's society anyone who parrots their beliefs and ideas becomes a celebrity to them. This guy is by no means a Bruce Springsteen.