Greenland Is Strategic. Annexation Is Not
Spenser A. Warren
January 20, 2026
Greenland Is Strategic. Annexation Is Not
As sea temperatures and geopolitical tensions simultaneously heat up, Greenland’s strategic importance increases. Against this backdrop, the specter of American territorial expansion has emerged as a new factor that is complicating Arctic security.
The evolving security environment in the Arctic necessitates deeper American involvement in the region. Specifically, the United States needs to enhance its military presence in Greenland by improving regional air and missile defenses. Future developments could call for other actions, such as reopening closed bases and deploying more troops to Greenland.
However, undermining the territorial integrity of Denmark — one of America’s strongest allies — would be a strategic miscalculation of epic proportions. It could fracture the European and Arctic security orders, providing greater opportunities for Russia and China. Instead of threatening Denmark, American actions in Greenland and the broader Arctic should be done in lockstep with our Danish and other regional allies.
Trump’s Greenland Ambitions
Twin dangers in the Arctic — the acute and enduring threat of Russia and the growth of Chinese regional ambitions — have captured the imagination of U.S. President Donald Trump, along with Greenland’s mineral resources. Trump has claimed that anything less than American ownership of Greenland is “unacceptable.” According to the president, control over the territory is needed to prevent it from falling into Russian and Chinese hands. Additionally, the president states control over Greenland is necessary to complete elements of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture. His interest in annexing Greenland for strategic reasons goes back to his first term, when he proposed purchasing it from Denmark.
Both claims are grossly overblown. American ownership over Greenland is not necessary to contain China and Russia. Collaboration with America’s NATO allies in the Arctic offers a better strategy for doing so.
Nor is it required to advance the Adminsitration’s missile defense goals. The United States has missile defense assets such as early warning radars and interceptors on the territory of several allied countries. This includes radar systems already in Greenland.
While the president’s emphasis on ownership is misplaced, his assessment that Greenland is a strategically critical territory for the United States is correct. As previously written in this outlet, Greenland is a “strategic linchpin in the Arctic.” Increasing our military presence in Greenland is a strategic imperative. Washington needs to take actions that will deter Russian aggression in the Arctic and improve our ability to counter Russian actions should deterrence fail. China’s growing presence in the region exacerbates these strategic needs.
But increasing our military footprint must be done through close collaboration with Copenhagen and Nuuk. To truly enhance Greenland’s security, the United States should take advantage of existing agreements with Denmark such as the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement that allow the United States significant freedom of action in Greenland.
Greenland and Strategic Competition in the Arctic
Greenland’s geographic position provides its critical strategic importance. It is near the top of the world, putting it close to the path of an intercontinental ballistic missile strike against the United States and making it an important location for early warning radars. It lies to the northeast of the United States, anchoring a line of early warning and air defense capabilities that protects America’s northern flank. It bounds the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom Gap, making it crucial for protecting North America from Russian naval capabilities and projecting Allied naval power. .
The defense of the Arctic is of growing importance. The United States and its allies have to contend with growing Russian capabilities and assertiveness in the region. Russia has expanded their conventional capabilities in the far north. They have also deployed novel nuclear-capable systems to the Arctic.
Russia’s military expansion and modernization includes the deployment of new submarine capabilities, such as the Borei-A class ballistic missile submarine, Yasen-M class attack submarine, and the highly secretive Belgorod submarine. Russia has also deployed Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missiles to the Arctic, as well as the Kinzhal aeroballistic missile. Both could theoretically carry a nuclear warhead.
Russia remains the region’s primary threat but is no longer the only one. China has growing Arctic ambitions. Beijing has increased its presence in the Arctic, embarking on a comprehensive strategy that includes growing political, economic, scientific, and military activity.
Improving Russian capabilities and growing Chinese interest coincides with melting sea ice. The impacts of global climate change have made the region more navigable, increasing both geopolitical competition and the risk of military escalation.
Strength Through Collaboration, not Confrontation
Attempts to coerce Denmark into relinquishing Greenland will do nothing to improve regional security. Instead, they threaten further integration and regional cooperation.
Moving beyond threats to action would be even more destabilizing. Military adventurism would crack open the Arctic and European security orders.
A U.S. attack against Greenland would constitute the first instance of one NATO member invading the territory of another. An invasion would create an immediate crisis for the alliance. Such action would violate Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which binds NATO parties to settle international disputes between them in a peaceful manner. Article 1 also commits member states to not engage in threats of force against member states. An attack would also create an unsolvable dilemma for NATO’s Article 5 on collective defense, the bedrock of the alliance. Either other NATO members uphold Article 5 and assist in the defense of Greenland — splitting the United States and the rest of NATO — or shirk Article 5 responsibilities. Failing to uphold Article 5 would undermine the alliance’s credibility. Upholding it would split the United States from the alliance. Even if NATO survived, it would be a far weaker alliance lacking either a credible security guarantee or the backing of the United States.
The biggest winner in this scenario is Russia. China would also see strategic benefits.
In extremis, cratering NATO would remove the primary impediment to Russian expansion in Europe and completely restructure the European security order. Even if NATO survived in a weakened state, it may not be able to deter Russian aggression against European countries.
Ending regional cooperation would also enable further Russian expansion in the Arctic, undermining the Trump Administration’s very goal of containing the Russian threat. Svalbard is the most likely site of future Russian expansion in the Arctic. Moscow is already increasingly assertive in the areas around it. Defending the archipelago from Russian attack or annexation requires deeper coordination between Norway, the United States, and regional allies such as Denmark.
Additionally, destroying the U.S.-led security order in the region would provide China with openings for diplomatic, economic, and security engagement in the area. Regional allies may turn to Beijing to counter Russian and American expansion in the region.
Deepening Security Engagement Without Ownership
Continued coercion, military or otherwise, risks creating the very scenario Washington wishes to avoid: Russian expansion and more Chinese engagement. Instead, the United States should deepen its current engagements with Denmark and Greenland’s home government.
Denmark is already a critical contributor to Arctic security. The Danes have contributed $15 billion to Arctic security initiative in just the last two years. They have a military presence in Greenland and cooperate with other Arctic and near-Arctic allies on a range of security issues. Denmark has also agreed to a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States that allows American access to Danish military bases.
Meanwhile, the United States already has valuable assets in Greenland. It should work with Nuuk and Copenhagen to expand and enhance these capabilities, including by improving air and missile defenses in Greenland. Currently, the United States only operates one base — the Pituffik Space Base — and stations approximately 150 troops in Greenland. The United States has had a much larger presence in the past, operating additional bases and deploying up to 10,000 troops at the height of the Cold War. While it is unlikely the United States will need to deploy that many troops or operate all of the former bases in the near future, the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement allows the United States to reopen as many of the former bases as Washington ultimately deems necessary and deploy a force much larger than the one the United States currently provides.
One place to start improving American capabilities in Greenland is by completing the renovations that are already underway at Pituffik. The exact extent of renovations are unknown, but officials have confirmed runway repairs, the deployment of a new icebreaker, and facilities upgrades that will ensure the base can continue to function in peacetime.
Additional improvements should ensure the security of the base during crises or war. The base and future additional installations in Greenland are vulnerable to Russia’s growing missile capabilities in the Arctic. Elsewhere, I have argued that Russia’s novel nuclear-capable weapons systems — including Tsirkon and Kinzhal — provide Russia with improved regional warfighting capabilities in Eastern Europe that the United States and NATO can overcome. The same is true for Greenland.
Countering the threat that Russia’s novel weapons pose should entail the deployment of regional air and missile defense capabilities to Greenland. While more sophisticated than other Russian missile systems, Kinzhal is vulnerable to Patriot air and missile defense systems. Some claims suggest that Tsirkon may also be vulnerable to Patriot or the European SAMP/T. Denmark ordered SAMP/T systems in 2025. While there are no interceptors currently in Greenland, the United States should bolster the security of Pituffik by deploying Patriot batteries, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, or other advanced missile defense capabilities.
Doing so would not make current or future early warning radars in Greenland impervious to a Russian missile attack, but that would not change with American ownership of Greenland. It does improve the security of the base, as well as Greenland as a whole, and decreases the likelihood of a successful Russian strike.
Currently, China poses a less severe military threat in the region. Countering China will require a broader Arctic strategy aimed at limiting Chinese political and economic influence while ensuring enough military capacity to deter future Chinese aggression. Greenland can play a significant role in this strategy. If necessary in the future, the United States has the option to deploy significantly more troops to Greenland. But that option only exists as long as Copenhagen and Nuuk trust that the United States will not try to conquer Greenland via fait accompli.
For its part, Denmark is likely to support an increased American presence, so long as it trusts the United States to not use expanded capabilities to take Greenland by force. Prior to Washington’s current push to annex Greenland, Denmark was urging the United States and NATO to invest more heavily in regional security. Denmark and Greenland have also telegraphed their willingness to work closely with the United States to improve Greenlandic security and support an increased American presence.
Denmark is also taking actions that will strengthen Greenland’s security. Copenhagen has invested in new naval vessels, drones, and space capabilities aimed at improving the defense of Greenland. They’ve also deployed more troops to Greenland as Trump has increasingly signaled his interest in annexing the territory. Denmark could choose to continue basing these troops in Greenland.
By working with, not against, Denmark, the United States will improve the regional security environment, better protect the North American homeland from Russian threats, and benefit its competition with China. The United States could expand its radar capabilities and deploy interceptors to bolster Greenland’s air and missile defense. Washington also has the option of increasing the American troop presence in Greenland should it be necessary. In combination with continued Danish investment in naval assets, drone capabilities, and troop deployments, Washington can achieve its strategic goals in Greenland without annexation.
https://warontherocks.com/2026/01/greenland-is-strategic-annexation-is-not/
