DawgTalkers.net Forums DawgTalk Pure Football Forum Lombardi's Theory: The Magic Number Is 50

well that Lombardi guy is one smart feller. he got this all figured out bby his self. and this is what we have in charge of our team. if you have a balance of run and pass for 3 quarters and do both well, you might be ahead going to the 4th quarter. that being said, in the 4th quarter are you going to run or pass the rock. I believe that 30 of 30 1st grade students can answer that question right without a lot of thought.

Interesting to see that the two teams to kick off the under 50 count are the Chargers and the Panthers, whose offensive minds are oddly enough running this offense. It will be interesting to see if this offense subscribes to Lombardi theory, because last time I checked, he ain't calling the plays.

I explained it in my last post. I don't think this is a gameplan or blueprint. It's a measurment.

"All you have to do is run 25 times/game...."


-soup

J/C
I have been busy crunching the numbers to prove/disprove my latest theory;
Good teams win more games that bad teams
Unfortunately I had to give up on my other quest;
If I'm outside and water is landing on my head,then it must be raining
too many variables.

Wait... so, you're telling me that the more successful plays we put together, the better our chances of winning games??


Woah!!

Mind. Blown.

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Good comment bugs, though I don't know if you can go in to it as a game plan.

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I think there are ways to game plan for it. I have ideas. I would love to discuss it, but it seems most of the board would rather just rip Lombardi and compare him to a first grader.

I tried earlier to get someone to actually talk about it..........you know........pure football........but, I haven't gotten any takers.

simple trent gets 2000 yards browns go to the playoffs.

Shoot. I'm all ears and curious.

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I think there are ways to game plan for it. I have ideas. I would love to discuss it...

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Then I need some help here. I see the observation as nothing more than stats, numbers after the fact. How would you set that as a goal?

A goal to play solid, fundamental football by preparing all phases of the team is what everyone strives for at all times. That and winning the game day chess match will get you those numbers. But how would you aim for those numbers? By what method would a coaching staff use those numbers as a goal?

Ddubia, take it one step further maybe. The quality of the plays chosen are important as well. The last few years, we ran a number of lousy plays every game that got us less than this Lombardi measurement would find acceptable. IMO the predictable ones hurt us getting to 50; the three and out club did little to keep themselves on the field. If we self-scouted, it seldom showed, because the middle on first and second, throw to the checkdown on third for less than needed was a predictable pattern.
Some areas of the field were seldom attacked, the deep routes and outside seem notable. And the number of misdirection plays, screens especially and sweeps were rare. The play mix winning teams use were exceptions in our playcalling. Pounding it to wear folks down, often shorter yardage gainers, are needed, but the mix of plays winning teams use, and the types of plays winning teams hurt us with and which we seldom tried were not the "winning" mix. Thes metric is interesting, but reverse engineered after the fact. It is a piece of the puzzle, but you run basic to set up best strengths plays. We did the former but not the other well. And when game situations mandate playcalling, like throwing to catch up, it is not a gameplan as much. It is all execution. But if we only ran seven plays, all TDs, it messes with this metric which is pure hindsight. Use it to a degeree, be awre of it, certainly. But it is not a solution in and of itself.

To take your reverse engineering down the road a bit ........ it's likely that you also don't get to 50 plays in a game if you only go for 6 yards/pass ..... or 3.5 yards/run ....... or other standards along the way, and that those standards are part of the overall plan the team puts together.

It makes sense, though, that extra plays in a game could easily result in extra scoring. Maybe a drive stalled on 4th down that results in a FG try turns into a TD with an extra play. Maybe 5 or 6 extra plays on offense in a game creates an extra drive (and score) entirely. Maybe it finishes a late drive that otherwise might have stalled.

I would guess that the team expects 4.2 to 4.4 yards per rush as a standard. That's not at all unreasonable. I would guess that they expect 7 yards/pass play as an average. That also is not unreasonable.

Using last season as an example, we threw the ball 566 times, for 3435 yards. That breaks down to roughly 6.1 yards/pass attempt. We also ran the ball 396 times for 1593 yards, at 4 yards/carry.

If we get that passing yards/attempt number up to 7, not unreasonable if Weeden can improve his completion percentage to 61% or 62% ..... and if we increase that yards/rush to 4.2 yards, all of a sudden we increase our offensive production by 588.6 yards for the year. That's almost an extra 37 yards/game production on offense. If we do that, we'll also gain extra opportunities on offense because we'll convert more 1st down opportunities.

These are aspects of the game that create a shell of a plan within game plan. They are goals within the game for each unit involved. Metrics just take the numbers associated with success and allow for a person or team to set goals for success based on what it takes for teams to succeed. Like anything else, there will be exceptions, The #1 team on defense might not be as strong of offense. A team with a crappy defense might not succeed even if they reach these numbers.

This is the shell of a plan for a team, a generalization as to what works in the NFL. Nothing wrong with that as a starting point. I'd rather start with what works, demonstrably, than to just pull numbers out of thin air without knowing for sure what the odds of success are if we achieve those numbers.

Interesting stat - ??? is what to do with it. Obviously for us would be to eliminate the bevy of BEND BUT DON'T BREAK defenses we have been running here since gosh knows when. Go with the Attack D n try to get as many 3 n outs as possible. So we hired a HC with that same philosophy...first words out of Chuds mouth to us.

Now on offense we desperately need a stretch especially a vertical stretch to create more room for offensive success in underneath patterns as well as the Runs or Check Down YAC in the passes.

Creating more first downs. Talent should get us in the Endzone from the red zone. But system should get us into that Red Zone marching down the field. Tiring the defense n keeping ours fresh. Pretty much a concept utilized for years. This stat pretty much gives a perspective on why that has been a football concept for decades. Why it is successful.

I like the stat.
The team who scores more points has a very good chance of winning.

Now what to execute to get us there

JMHO

Anyone thinking that you can actually plan for this is confusing Causation for Correlation. This stat is something that is the result of being good, not something that can be used to make you good.

Just clicking. Man, we need the season to start.

j/c

To me it's about execution of those plays.

No matter the stats, if you have a team that doesn't execute your plays to be successful, nothing will change.

So you need quality personnel and well designed plays called, a team prepared and with enough talent to execute the plays called. Without all of those key ingrediants I don't believe anything else is truly relivant.

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Anyone thinking that you can actually plan for this is confusing Causation for Correlation.

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Exactly.... If the plays you run early are successful, then you sustain drives and you get to run more plays...

more plays = more runs + more pass attempts to be completed.

Also, the more successful you are early, the more the defense gets back on its heels, the more plays are going to work...

I guarantee you that I could get to 50 every week and probably never win a game if I pounded it up the middle and threw nothing but dump off passes.. but I wouldn't get many first downs, I'd be lucky to run 60 plays and I'd never win... those numbers are the result of a successful offense, not the other way around.

Don't get me wrong, it's a decent barometer for measuring success but it's not a game plan... it's like saying a basketball team should win if they shoot 25 or more free throws a game... you don't just get to shoot free throws, they are a byproduct of aggressively attacking the basket, getting offensive rebounds, etc..

OK, I had to check last year and see how this theory played out in actual games. Pass completions plus runs are considered "good", or "quality" plays just for a name for the measurement.

Against the Eagles, we had 34 pass completions plus runs. We had 15 drives in that game, but ended 4 of them with interceptions. The Eagles also had 4 passes intercepted. The Eagles actually had 59 total completions and runs.

We had 49 pass completions plus runs against the Bengals in our 1st game against them, and managed to put up 27 points. We lost, but we scored at a respectable level. We had 11 total drives in that game. The Bengals also totaled 49 pass completions plus runs.

In the 3rd game, we had 40 completions plus runs. We had 12 drives. We only scored 14 points. The Bills completed 22 passes and ran 34 for a total of 56 "quality" plays.

Week 4 saw us have 42 pass completions plus runs. We scored 16 points on 14 drives. The Ravens had 27 runs and 28 completions for 55 "good" plays.

We played the Giants in week 5. We had 41 pass completions plus runs. We scored 27 points on 10 drives. The Giants had 25 completions and 34 runs for 59 "good" plays.

We finally won a game week 6, against the Bengals.. We had 17 completions and 34 runs for 51 total "quality" plays. (or however you want to quantify them) We had 16 drives.

Week 7 we played the Colts. We had 25 completions and 17 runs for 42 "good" plays. We scored only 13 points on 10 drives. The Colts had 52 runs plus completions.

Week 8 was a mess. We completed 11 passes and ran 33 times against the Chargers to get our 2nd win. We had 11 drives.The Chargers actually had 52 runs plus completions. This is, if I did things right, the first time the formula failed, and it was in a massive windstorm where neither team could pass.

We played the Ravens week 9. We scored 15 points on 47 pass completions plus runs. We had 11 drives. The Ravens had 52 pass completions plus runs. The Ravens won.

Week 10 was our bye.

Week 11 we played the Cowboys. We had 22 completions for 33 runs for 55 total "good plays. The Cowboys outdid us with 21 receptions and 35 runs for 56 total "good" plays. They won.

We played the Steelers week 12. We had 17 completions and 34 runs for 51 total "good" plays. The Steelers had 20 runs and 20 completions for 40. We won.

Week 13 saw us beat the Raiders. 25 completions plus 30 runs for 55 "good" plays. The Raiders had 51 total "good" plays.

Week 14 we took on the Chefs. (the lowest scoring team in the NFL last year) We had 17 completions and 35 runs, for 52 "good" plays. The Chefs had 10 completions and 26 runs. We won big.

Week 15 was against the Redskins. We had 21 completions and 17 runs, for 38 "good" plays. The Skins had 26 and 35 for 61. They won by 17.

We played the Broncos week 16. We had 18 runs and 21 completions. The Broncos had 30 completions plus 32 runs. 62 beats 39, and they beat us by 22.

In the finale, we played the Steelers. We had 22 pass completions and 26 runs. (48 total) The Steelers had 15 completions and 28 runs. (43 total) Neither team reached the magical 50. As far as I tell, this game, plus the Chargers game that was played in a hurricane, were the only 2 games where the team with the higher number of completions plus runs actually lost.

Kind of interesting to go through the games and look at this. You would think that big plays would factors more into this, and perhaps they do by increasing a lead and allowing more runs at the end of a game, but a big play would also create a shorter scoring drive. Nonetheless, it does appear that there is some value in the "50 play" theory. It's not an end in and of itself, but it is a goal that has some value.

j/c

Bill Walsh's NFL draft philosophies: Six lessons from the master

By Michael Lombardi NFL Network


One of my greatest memories (and learning experiences) from my days as an NFL executive was being around Bill Walsh during draft preparation.

The legendary San Francisco 49ers head coach had a unique perspective on the NFL draft -- one rooted in time spent with another coaching icon, Paul Brown, while Walsh worked for as an assistant for the Cincinnati Bengals. Walsh always thought differently in so many areas of the game, on and off the field. Many of Walsh's disciples have been able to take his West Coast offense and duplicate his success. However, few were able to leave the 49ers with his skills as an executive. Walsh knew exactly what his team needed before each draft to challenge every season for a Super Bowl.

Since we are just 10 days from the 2012 NFL Draft, I thought it'd be fun to go over six of Walsh's biggest hot-button issues with the drafting process. Some come in the form of the statements you might hear or read and others highlight Walsh's unique view on scouting.

1) Describing the player by the round he should be taken. Walsh hated hearing a scout tell him a player was, for example, not a good second-rounder, but a great third-rounder. He always said the only time people talk about rounds is in draft preparation and on draft day. Never during any player's career, Walsh would vent, does anyone say a player was picked in the right round. The day after the draft, every player is graded on his playing performance, not his selection round. Walsh only cared about what a player would be able to do for his team. He thought "round talk" was the wrong way for a scout to measure his own abilities. It was not talent evaluation, but rather round prediction. When I was in Cleveland, we had a scout who would rarely say much before the draft. When asked a question before draft day, he was vague, unwilling to commit to an opinion, almost sheepish. He refused to extend himself, always playing it safe. However, once the draft was over, he instantly become a new man. He'd sit in the draft room, review every team's pick and grade his work based on his round predictions, as if that was the true litmus test. I can still see him sitting there, looking like he just aced the exam. Walsh always told everyone: It never matters where we pick them, it only matters how they play. If Texas A&M quarterback Ryan Tannehill goes eighth overall to the Dolphins and plays great, no one is going to remember where he was taken, just that he produces on the field. If he stinks, it will be a blown pick, regardless of where it occurred.

2) "This is a bad draft." This statement drove Walsh nuts, as he felt it was a huge copout by scouts. I talk to certain people every year before the draft, and every year they lament the weakness of that year's draft class, as if I don't remember those exact words the year before. Walsh would remind everyone in the room that the draft only needed enough depth for his team to acquire 12 good players. Satisfying every team was not his concern. All he cared about was finding talent for his own team. Therefore, the depth of talent in each draft was not irrelevant.

3) "We should trade down -- there is no one worth picking at our spot." Even though Walsh loved to move up or down, he felt that scouts always wanted to trade down to avoid putting their reputations on the line. He didn't like scouts shying away from making the tough call when he had to make tough calls all the time. He would ask scouts/personnel directors: "What do you want us to do: Pass on the pick?" When the cost of draft picks soared in prior years, moving down was a great option. But with the new collective bargaining agreement's reduced rookie pay scale, it is not as financially dangerous to just make the pick. Walsh believed there was always someone worth picking, because three years from any draft, people will look back at the great players in the league who were passed over by a number of teams. Once again, Walsh was all about the talent, not the spot.

4) Watch out for players from downtrodden programs -- particularly programs that have just fired a coach -- being unfairly downgraded. In Walsh's mind, players from a program that has just fired its coach pay a price in draft evaluation. Coaches rarely admit the real reason for their termination -- bad coaching -- instead placing the blame on bad players. These side effects of a losing culture can taint a scout's visit to a particular school. Walsh insisted that all the college prospects in this situation had to be examined closely.

5) "Never take the one-year wonder and look forward; take the one-year wonder and look back." After Walsh was burned by a one-year wonder in the 1987 draft -- Clemson running back Terrence Flagler -- he became skeptical of limited track records. If a good coach was unable to get a player to produce before his final season with the program, how could he expect to get consistent effort at the NFL level? In a similar vein, former Georgetown coach John Thompson has explained a scenario on the recruiting trail that I love to reference. When the parents of a prospective recruit would ask Thompson to make sure their son attended classes, despite his spotty attendance in high school, Thompson always responded with a simple question: "If you can't get him to go, what makes you think I can?"

6) "The first year we will teach the players the system, the second year we will develop their skills within the system." Walsh thought overloading a rookie with the entire playbook was a bad mistake. He wanted to have a defined role for each first-year player, and then expand that role in Year 2. His biggest concern was making sure his guys played fast, which required them to react, not think first. With the lockout eliminating minicamps and OTAs this past offseason, teams were forced to cut down on overloading rookies with too much information. And many rookies went on to make significant contributions to their teams in the 2011-12 campaign, further proving Walsh's theory.

In the next 10 days, as you're bombarded with pre-draft analysis, try and think like Coach Walsh. As he would often remind me, "If we are all thinking alike, then no one is thinking."

http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d82...from-the-master

Good article. Thanks.